lower than that of the United States, she would invite the commerce of all nations to her ports, as is already, to some extent, the case; and whilst she thus increased the demand for her productions she would drive the manufacturers of the United States from her markets, from the fact that American manufacturers could not so well compete with those of Europe. In this way the immense trade of the northern Mexican States, as well as Texas, would fall into the hands of European merchants, and pass through our ports and territory. In a few years the loss to the American manufacturer would not be a small amount. But, on the other hand, by annexation these advantages would be secured to the American merchant, to the exclusion of the European, for we should then be but one Government, and, consequently, in the markets of Texas, no duties could be levied upon home manufactures. The tariff of the United States would operate then to insure to their own citizens a valuable market which must otherwise inevitably be lost to them, not to say anything about the embarrassments to their revenues by the smuggling which would certainly be carried on. The exchange of commodities between Texas and Europe would give rise to a feeling of reciprocal benefit, and there would be nothing in all this to excite national cupidity or jealousy toward us. Thus situated, Texas might remain at peace for a half-century, nor is it probable that she would even then have war, unless it was with Mexico. Her resources having accumulated for this period, she would have sufficient means and ample capacity to subjugate Mexico whenever she might choose so to do. The efficiency and hardy character of her population would also enable wise leaders to render subservient the means of Mexico to her own subjugation. This is an imperfect glance at some of the advantages which Texas might hope for as a separate power.
By immediate annexation, we relieve ourselves of the solicitude which we have felt as to our situation. Yet that would be no guarantee for immediate peace. Mexico might make annexation a cause of war, and inflict annoyances upon us. It might be some time before the proper aid from the United States would be available for our defense against incursion; such incursion would seriously interrupt our citizens in their peaceful avocations. It is quite possible, too, that England and France would be greatly dissatisfied at the consummation of the contemplated measure, and if so, though no great injury to the United States might eventually result, yet it would at least give much complication to the affairs of the nation.
You may rely upon it, General, that it is essentially important to Texas to be protected by the United States against the contingencies hinted at, even during the progress of negotiations.
This must be assured to her, otherwise she may act unwisely in entertaining any proposition on the subject for a single moment. I, however, rely with confidence upon the magnanimity of that Government to see that she suffers no detriment, either now or hereafter, from the plain manifestation of affection toward the mother-land.
There is a sameness or unity in our national interests and institutions in Texas which does not exist in the United States. All our population is agricultural, and we have no sectional institutions or diversified interests. The farming, manufacturing, maritime, and mercantile interests all claim the peculiar consideration of the national Congress. Texas, independent, would be free from the agitations arising from this condition of things. The interests of the North
