Page:Life of William Shelburne (vol 1).djvu/407

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1768
THE BEDFORD WHIGS
381

before it was signed he sent Butofuoco to remonstrate against it; that the Duke affected to be much offended, saying, Paoli took too much the tone of equality with France, but since that, has often spoken to Butofuoco regretting his (Paoli's) obstinacy, saying that he is a ruined man; and has succeeded in frightening Butofuoco (whom he takes still to be an honest man) upon his account.

I ventured then to say that I perceived he had once been on a very good footing with M. Choiseul, and was surprised at the present change. He said he would make no scruple to inform me of the substance of all their negotiations together.

Soon after the close of the late war, when he found all application to England, the natural protector to Corsica, was in vain, having tried it by my Lord Bristol and others, he next thought of turning towards France. At this very time there came to him, with an offer of his service, an officer, whose name I forgot, who had killed his colonel in France. He was a man of parts and address, but Paoli soon found out that he had formerly been employed in Russia as a spy for the French, and was now sent in the same capacity to him. He let him know he was discovered and in his power, but proposed to him to save himself and serve both France and Corsica, by carrying proposals from him to the Due de Choiseul. He readily accepted the alternative, and Paoli says, executed his commission with fidelity and address, and that even by means of this agent he had almost concluded an alliance with Corsica, upon an independent footing, with France, when M. Praslin stepped in with his four years' Convention with the Genoese, which he (Paoli) says, the Duc de Choiseul always called the Traité Marchandé.[1] By the Treaty which Paoli meditated at this time, Corsica was to be declared a free nation under the protection of France, attached perpetually and inseparably to her interests, the enemies of the one to be the enemies of the other and their . friendships mutual. The advantages which he held out to engage M. Choiseul were these: he showed the great resource it offered for recruiting the armies and navies of France, and how by its situation it would enable her to give the law to all the Italian states. The King of Sardinia would absolutely hold his island at their discretion, and Piémont itself would be open to her attacks; Genoa, Tuscany, the Pope, Naples and Sicily, would lay equally under the rod, and while these last were in danger, even Spain would be obliged more than ever to cultivate a union with France. As to the English they would no longer be able to domineer in those seas; their fleets might parade in vain at Gibraltar and Mahon, while their trade to Genoa, Leghorn, Civita Vecchia, Naples and all the Levant

  1. In 1764.