Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/142

IX. PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. xi., No. 3. J. E. Creighton. 'The Purposes of a Philosophical Association.' [President's address to the American Philosophical Association, 1902. Philosophers have been largely occupied with the history of their science, and have neglected personal intercourse and co-operation. Knowledge of the history of philosophy is essential, but the history is intelligible only when read in the light of present-day problems ; and personal meetings tend to bring historical studies into closer and more intimate relation to one's own philosophical standpoint. Co-operation means fruitful work and sanity of outlook, as well as encouragement to the individual. Overtly and consciously, the purpose of a philosophical association should be to promote and en- courage original investigation and research. It will thus help to remove two common reproaches made against philosophy : that its representa- tives are lacking in scholarly devotion to their subject, and that it is barren of practical result. As for the relation of philosophy to natural science, "philosophy has to humanise its facts, to look at them from the standpoint of complete and self-conscious human experience ".] W. A. Hammond. ' The Significance of the Creative Reason in Aris- totle's Philosophy.' [Aristotle's theory must be derived from his general epistemology, from the meaning which he gives to ' form ' and ' matter/ from the development of the Socratic- Sophistic controversy regarding conceptual and perceptual knowledge, and from special passages of the De Anima and the Analytics. His position mediates between the ultra-sensualism of the Sophists and the ultra-rationalism of Plato : the gulf between subject and object is bridged by the immanence of rational forms in empirical reality.] W. M. Urban. 'The Relation of the Individual to the Social Value-series.' n. [The introduction of the concept of complementary values into modern value theories promises to extend the range of quantitative conceptions to the ex- planation of purely inner personal values. But (1) the principle adopted by the economist-moralists to account for the phenomena of per- sonal sanction, and for the absolute moment in the personal series, is not quantitative but aesthetic and qualitative ; (2) the ideal personal values that arise in the working out of the qualitative law of the in- dividual series have the absolute moment only in the aesthetic isolation of the personality ; they are more or less indifferent from the standpoint of the social series ; and (3) the indefinite development of these personal values is so far independent of the social values and their mutations, is so much a function of the personality, that it may be realised irrespec- tively of the phenomenal content derived from the sphere of social values. How, then, do the moments differ out of which the value- function arises in the two spheres ? In the different role played in the two cases by the negative factor. " The difference between internal and external oppositions lies in the fact that, while in the external oppositions