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96 CRITICAL NOTICES : are always mixed with the phenomena of feeling, they are grouped about a sentiment rather than about an idea "- 1 The second is a type of transition ; in it, thought becomes detached from ten- dencies and organised apart, but only to serve them the more effectively. " We do not yet see the mind create a new tendency whose centre should be the intellect itself, whose end should be the development of the intellect. So far the intellect in some sort passes out of the character only to return to it, and in order to be of service to it organises itself outside." 2 In the third type the intellect is constituted as independent of the sentiments ; it be- comes an end in itself. We are all familiar with the love of knowledge for itself; and if it is rare unmingled with other sentiments, it is common enough blended with the love of fame or wealth. If this is what M. Paulhan means by his third type, we have a clear conception of it, but I do not think this is his meaning. If it were, the problem of this book would have assumed a different form. Instead of asking how the intellect comes to detach itself from desire and sentiment, he would have asked how a new senti- ment comes to be formed with its dependent desires the love of knowledge for itself : or more precisely since a sentiment so abstract as this is rare and must await the formation of its own species how the love of any species of knowledge has arisen. He would not have anticipated that, when thought has formed itself into a relatively coherent system, this system of thought would be any more separate from feeling (phenomenes affectifs) than in its former wholly subordinate state. The popular mode of regarding the relation between the intellect and the sentiments seems to have had an unfortunate influence on his thought. We are accustomed to their antithesis. We think of the one as so cold that in its higher developments it seems to have w r holly separated itself from the sentiments and emotions. Of a certainty, the intellect can only work disinterestedly and with due self-control when intense emotions are absent. But the strength of a feeling is not to be measured by its intensity alone, and many of our most persistent feelings are the calmest. Between the lowering of the intensity of feeling in a system of thought and its total disappearance from that system, there is all the difference. How would the different systems of our thought have ever developed unless they had been supported by feeling ? how can they continue to grow except by its persistence ? We know what happens to a man when he has lost interest in his work : the system of his thought ceases to grow ; it languishes ; the sequence of his ideas is less coherent ; his attention cannot be maintained. And yet the " feeling-tone " of his thought may seldom have been sufficiently intense to have obtruded itself. But when the love of work has left him, he is quick to discern its absence. 1 Esprits Logiques, p. 40. 2 Ibid., p. 66.