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EEPLY TO ME. MUIBHEAD's CKITICISM. 375 have made use of argument ; but no such answer is forthcoming. And while my criticism was necessarily brief, it went beyond " a few sentences," as Mr. Muirhead puts it; the consideration of difficulties suggested by Professor Sidgwick, exclusive of further remarks with reference to Mr. Spencer's objections, having ex- tended to a page and a half of an article which, in all, amounted only to fifteen pages. I have now arrived at what may be called the main point of Mr. Muirhead's criticism : his contention that hedonic instruction he seems to mean of any and all forms, and makes no allusion to the particular lines that I suggested would have no influence. After this contention, however, he deviates somewhat from the main issue, and I have to follow the course of the deviation. (1) He observes that the utilitarian theory " sets the pleasure of the individual in competition with general well-being ". Here we have again trotted out an old familiar argument which, in the face of the clear explanations given by utilitarians again and again, has seemed to me so unwarranted as scarcely to merit refutation. I can only repeat that the utilitarian theory does not set individual pleasure in competition with the general well-being. It approves of individual happiness in so far as it is adding to the sum total of general happiness ; and that is, of course, in every case where it does not conflict with that happiness. But it enjoins the sup- pression of whatever individual aims seem to operate against the social weal. As to Mr. Spencer's conclusion that we must work first for self, then for others, Mr. Muirhead must surely have forgotten that we are asked to pursue this policy because in the long run it proves to be the most altruistic, the most conducive to general happiness. And, practically, as we all know, it is pursued by Neo-Kantians and Neo-Hegelians, as well as by other people. Mr. Muirhead returns to the main issue by asking the following questions : "In the conduct demanded by the higher morality of anytime," "are not egoism and altruism almost certain at one point or another to collide ? And in these circumstances with what degree of effectiveness can appeal be made to the waverer ? " As regards the first question, in the case of the more highly endowed morally, while present individual gratification may not infrequently collide with general well-being, conduct that tends to ultimate or greatest individual happiness in the long run, would rarely come into collision with the altruistic end. 1 In the case of 1 It is in the interest of social well-being that there should be those who run counter to received opinion in different directions. And persons who voluntarily choose this course may suffer considerably from social intolerance to the end of the chapter ; hence the ultimate happiness of exceptional individuals, who may be highly endowed morally, may cer- tainly not accord with social well-being. It is doubtful, however, if, with strong inclinations in the directions referred to, they would have been happier had they chosen a more compromising course. But these are tlie very few who do not come into consideration in a general question.