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376 B. BAIN : the average person, such collision would be more common, still much rarer than the colliding with present gratification. And to point out these facts, as well as to develop sympathy with others, should assuredly form part of the duty of the ethical teacher. How far we may be influenced to put aside present inclination by the thoughts of future happiness depends, of course, upon individual character, and may be of next to no degree, and of all degrees. And much the same may be said of egoism versus altruism. To be wiUing to suppress every personal aim that might seem to detract from the general well-being w T ould mean to have attained to an impossible perfection ; but between this and being in no way influenced by a desire not to act in a manner opposed to the happiness of others, there are, I need scarcely say, multitudinous degrees. As I formerly remarked, with those who are capable of little or no sympathy, a much fuller realisation of how their con- duct, directly and indirectly, will injure and benefit others may be expected to have little or no effect. But with the rest of us, it cannot possibly be said that such realisation is of no avail as an influence opposed to pure selfishness. To maintain this is to deny the operations of sympathy, to argue that the appeal of the phil- anthropist and social reformer is a mere sham (we may go further and add that there is no philanthropist or no genuine social re- former), and that the politician is simply wasting his words when he asks us to co-operate in behalf of classes and sections of society other than our own, and to consider the interests of different nationalities. (2) Mr. Muirhead's next objection is that " Hedonism sets the lower instincts in comparison with the higher " ; and that "it is inevitable in the present stage of human development that to the great mass of mankind the latter should seem distant, problematic and insipid in comparison with the former ". In the first place, I object both to the word instinct and to the terms higher and lower. Nor do I know the specific meanings intended to be conveyed by the phrase " higher and lower instincts ". But suppose it to mean what is popularly regarded as our higher and lower ten- dencies and desires, and that our whole nature is being taken into account, or, in other words, that we are looking to its physical and intellectual, as well as to its purely moral side. Universalistic hedonism or utilitarianism does not set an undue gratification of "lower" tendencies and desires in competition with the "higher," but disapproves of excess in this, as in every direction. On the other hand, seeing that a due regard to certain so-called lower desires is essential to human happiness, the utilitarian must value it accordingly. If, for instance, a man gratifies his artistic, musical or literary tastes at the expense of proper attention to his food, his devotion to the " higher instincts " deserves not admira- tion but reprobation : he is wanting either in common sense or in self-control. Again, to adopt a somewhat stale example, if in giving rein to his philanthropic impulses, he neglects his own