Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/572

556 CRITICAL NOTICES : tion, What is the difference between truth and error? and this neglect shows itself in many surprising doctrines. One of these, which reappears frequently, occurs in his very first chapter. He here distinguishes ' science ' from ' philosophy,' very properly, I think, by the fact that science presupposes a determinate object, which it examines as 'fixed and immovable'. But he seems to think that, for this reason, thought can only be studied scientifi- cally in the form of language. We are not, therefore, surprised to find (p. 6) that the Aristotelian Logic is identified with grammar or philology ; and that the difference between affirmation and negation is represented as concerning onh r ' the translation of thought, not thought itself (p. 13). Psychology, again, on this view, can, of course, not be a science ; and accordingly we find M. Brunschvicg appealing to ' psychological analysis ' in confir- mation of his view that ' relations ' have no significance for what he considers the true, or philosophical, Logic (p. 13, note). Similarly Mill's doctrine of ' association ' is simply a result of ' philological analysis ' (p. 10) . Many would have thought that its lack of logical significance was due to its psychological character ; but for M. Brunschvicg, on the contrary, it is not true Logic, just because it is not Psychology. Again, we should expect to find that where the analysis of ' intellectual activity ' is identified with logical analysis, some difficulty would be found in distinguishing that which is logically, from that which is temporally, prior. And M. Brunschvicg does not disappoint us. The twelve types of judgment, which he takes to illustrate his doctrine of modality, cannot, indeed (he tells us), be deduced from the forms of modality a 2)riori ; but, neverthe- less, they are to be arranged in a systematic order, according to the modality which they exhibit (p. 111). And this systematic order, so far as it is systematic at all, corresponds strikingly with the order of genetic psychology. The first type in the theoretic list is a mere ' unconscious ' ' psychical fact,' such as, according to M. Brunschvicg, is exhibited in catalepsy (and I do not know enough psychology to contradict him). The first in the practical list is, similarly, the purely automatic movement of the organism, which, however, M. Brunschvicg seems to regard as necessarily preceded by a certain amount of conscious psychical effort, which he finds in ' instinct ' : it is, I suppose, merely because he makes this mistake of taking the development of instinct to imply con- scious rather than sub-conscious adaptation, that he does not begin with that. But we have not merely M. Brunschvicg's deeds to appeal to, when we accuse him of confusion in his use of ' prior ' (anterieur) ; he has given us, in his Conclusion (pp. 238- 240), a truly wonderful passage, on the connexion of time with modality. He here tells us that ' the judgment, in order to posit the existence of the object, as independent of its own existence, posits the object as being before the judgment, if the judgment is theoretic, and as to be (devant etre) after the judgment, when it is