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FBIEDRICH JODL, Lehrbuch der Psychologic. 241 of the relation which, in this state, these elements bear to each other. The essence of the " physiological " theory is to find no elements in the analysis but those mentioned, and no explanation of their combination but the instinctive reaction on whatever may serve as the stimulus. So understood the theory loses much of its paradoxical character ; unfortunately, though referring to James' later statement, Prof. Jodl seems only acquainted with the earlier and cruder formulation and not to have followed closely the later course of the discussion. The best part of the treatment of the affective phenomena, and one of the best parts of the book, is that which deals with the aesthetic feelings. There is nothing striking or original in the views presented ; they are those probably the most widely current, or at least the best accredited ; but the lines are drawn with clearness and precision and the whole discussion is itself a w r ork of art calculated to produce as much conviction as pleasure. Perhaps the least satisfactory part of the book is that which treats of the wih 1 . There are a good many psychologists to-day who deny that will is an elementary process in consciousness at all, and it would have been well, no doubt, if their views had re- ceived more careful consideration, particularly as they can fasten on the admission that to a more exact observation conation appears as a sum of minute motor impulses, which they can then plausibly proceed to resolve into a sum of actual or reproduced motor or other sensations. I think myself that a sufficient answer to this objection is to say that the phenomena are here viewed from the point of view of function, that the attitude expressed in conation is unique, and that it is elementary in so far as it seems to be a necessary aspect of all conscious process regarded as not merely passive, but as reactive, adaptive and spontaneous. All this is implied, I think, in what is here said of it. But the analysis of a function consists in the enumeration of all the conditions of its exercise, just as the analysis of the causal relation consists in the enumeration of all the circumstances essential to the event ; and I do not find. that the analysis here given shows sufficient appre- ciation of the complexity of the problem. There is no adequate discrimination of the different types of function that are referred to under the term " will," nor is there any clear exhibition of the continuity in the development of volition or of its connexion with the developing content of self-consciousness. For anything that is expressly stated, self-consciousness might not be implicated in the process at all. In the discussion of the higher forms of voli- tion, the emphasis, one might almost say the sole emphasis, is laid on the motivation of the will in feeling. This is, of course, in general, correct ; unless the object thought made some appeal to action, it is impossible to see how it could ever become acted on. But in what lies this appeal, the felt value which moves the will ? Ultimately, we are told, in qualities of pleasure and pain, and as these qualities have only intensive value, the sole measure 16