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REMARKS ON THE PREDICATES OF MORAL JUDGMENTS.
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to any man to commit such a crime;[1] and the modern Shintoist concludes that the primæval Japanese were pure and holy from the fact that they are represented as a people who had no moral commandments.[2] It is this prohibitive character of "ought" that has imparted to duty that idea of antagonism to inclination which has found its most famous expression in the Kantian ethics, and which made Bentham look upon the word itself as having in it "something disagreeable and repulsive".[3] It is this intrinsic connexion between "ought" and "wrong" that has given to duty the most prominent place in ethical speculation whenever moral pessimism has been predominant. Whilst the ancient Greeks, with whom happiness was the state of nature, never spoke of duty and held virtue to be the Supreme Good, Christianity, on the other hand, which looked upon man as a being born and bred in sin, regarded morals pre-eminently as the science of duty. Then, again, in modern times, Kant's categorical imperative came as a reaction against that moral optimism which once more had given the preference to virtue, considering everything in the world or in humanity beautiful and good from the very beginning.[4] It is also worth noting that the feeling of self-complacency connected with the consciousness of having acted in accordance with the law of duty has no distinctively expressive name in ordinary language, while the opposite feeling is known by so familiar and distinctive a term as "remorse". This is not, as has been said,[5] "a significant indication of the moral condition of mankind," but a significant indication of the true import of the notion of duty itself. We may undoubtedly applaud him who is faithful to his duty, but the idea of duty involves no applause. There is no contradiction in the omission of an act being disapproved of and the performance of it being praised. "Ought" and "duty" express only the disapproval of its omission, and say nothing about the consequences of its performance. The conscientious man refuses the homage paid to him, by saying, "I have only done my duty". Duty is a "stern law-giver," who threatens with punishment, but promises no reward.

The ideas of "ought " and "duty" thus spring from the

  1. Diogenes Laërtius, Solon, ch. x.; Cicero, Pro S. Roscio Amerino, ch. xxv.
  2. Griffin, The Religions of Japan, p. 72.
  3. Bentham, Deontology, vol. i, p. 10.
  4. Cf. Ziegler, Social Ethics, pp. 22, 75, sq.
  5. Murray, An Introduction to Ethics, p. 108.