Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/202

188 EDWARD WESTEBMABCK: same source as the idea of wrong, that is, from the emotion of moral indignation. To say that a man ought to do a thing is, so far as the morality of his action is concerned, the very same thing as to say that it is wrong of him not to do it. And the wrongness of an action is nothing but its tendency to call forth moral indignation. " Wrong " is popularly regarded as the opposite of right, and they are really contradictories in a certain sense within the sphere of moral valuation. We do not call the actions of irresponsible beings " right," although they are not wrong, nor do we pronounce morally indifferent actions of respon- sible beings to be "right," unless we wish thereby especially to mark their moral value, as not being wrong. If the question is put whether it is right for a man to do a certain thing, the answer may be in the affirmative, and can certainly not be in the negative, in case the act is not regarded as wrong. But the most proper answer would be, that he has a right to do it. The adjective "right," in its strict sense, refers to cases from which the indifferent is excluded. A right action is the right action, and other alternatives are wrong. " Right " is thus closely related to " ought," but at the same time " right " and " obligatory " are not identical. I cannot subscribe to the view of Prof. Sidgwick, that "in the recognition of conduct as 'right' is involved an authoritative prescription to do it "- 1 What is right is in accordance with the moral law ; the adjective right looks upon duty as fulfilled. It is true that the super-obligatory also is right. But " right " takes no notice of the super- obligatory as distinct from the obligatory, and what goes beyond duty always involves the fulfilment of some duty. It may be admitted to be "not only right," but not to be more right. Eight has no comparative. A duty is either fulfilled or not, and unless it be perfectly fulfilled the conduct is wrong. There are degrees of wrongness and of goodness, as the moral indignation and the moral approval may be stronger or weaker, but there are no degrees of Tightness. The fact that the right action is a duty fulfilled, accounts for the erroneous opinion so generally held by ethical writers, that " right " is intrinsically connected with moral approval. 2 The choice of the right alternative may give us satisfaction, 1 Sidgwick, loc. cit., p. 106 sq. 2 Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections u-ith Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728), p. 279; Clifford, Lectures and Essays (1886), pp. 294, 304 sq. ; Fowler and Wilson. The Principles of Morals, vol. ii., p. 199; Alexander, Moral Order and Progress, p. 399 ; etc.