Page:NCGLE v Minister of Home Affairs.djvu/69

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Ackermann J

[71]I am strengthened in this conclusion by the fact that in several jurisdictions, courts have held that they do possess the power to read words into statutes where appropriate. In Schachter,[1] the leading Canadian case, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a court may read words into a statute in appropriate circumstances and set out principles to guide such decisions. Since then, Canadian courts have read words into statutes on several occasions.[2] Courts in the United States also accept that they have the power to read words into statutes to provide remedies for unconstitutionality.[3] The Israeli Supreme Court[4] and the German Constitutional


  1. Above n 93 at 11–25.
  2. See Miron v Trudel above n 65 paras 178–181. See also Egan v Canada above n 44 at 159–161 (in which the dissenters proposed the reading of words into a statute); Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney-General) (1994) 107 DLR (4th) 342 at 383–4.
  3. See Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v Bennett 284 US 239 (1931); Welsh v United States 398 US 333 (1970); Califano, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare v Westcott et al 443 US 76 (1979); Skinner v Oklahoma 316 US 535 (1942); and a discussion of the issue by Bruce K Miller “Constitutional Remedies for Underinclusive Statutes: A Critical Appraisal of Heckler v Mathews” in 20 Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review (1985) 79 and by Evan H Caminker “A Norm-Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive Statutes” in 95 Yale Law Journal (1985–6) 1185.
  4. El Al Israel Airlines, cited above n 66.

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