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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 241. | General Collins submits a seven step recommendation which centers on getting rid Of Diem and reorganizing the government structure. Collins 4448 to Dulles, 9 April 1955 | 894 |
| 242. | Diem exists by reason of U.S. support despite French reluctance. If the French view prevails, "removal of Diem…may well be interpreted in Vietnam and Asia as an example of U.S. paying lip service to nationalist cause, and then forsaking a true nationalist leader when 'colonial interests' put enough pressure on us." Dulles 4438 to Saigon, 9 Apr 55 | 907 |
| 243. | Bao Dai recommends that the U.S. agree with the French to create a "Supreme Council" or "Council of Elders to govern in place of Diem. The Binh Xuyen could have been used in the common effort if "Diem had not bungled matters." Bao Dai cannot rule for Diem by decree and considers Diem's strength as a "mockery." Paris 4396 to Dulles, 9 Apr 55 | 910 |
| 244. | Ely disagrees with the U.S. on maintaining Diem in office. The worsening situation is attributed to Diem by the French and "only by surgery, that is removal of Diem, can the country be saved." Ely feels that if Diem is retained, he could not be the responsible French representative or remain in Saigon. Saigon 4661 to Dulles (Excerpts) 19 Apr 55 | 912 |
| 245. | Diem is seen as a barrier to forming an interim government and the gap between him and other elements in the society is becoming wider. The U.S., however, warns Vietnamese leaders that if Diem is removed as a "sect victory" it would be "difficult to obtain popular support in the U.S. for continuation of U.S. aid." Saigon 4662 to Dulles, 20 Apr 55 | 915 |
| 246. | Diem announces to the U.S. his willingness to accept a coalition in the government but on his terms. This uncompromising attitude leads Collins to remark: "I see no alternative to the early replacement of Diem." Saigon 4663 to Dulles, 20 Apr 55 | 918 |
| 247. | Conclusions and recommendations are offered as a basis for future Department of Defense positions on the subject of South Vietnam. Key recommendations made are: to determine U.S. military action within the scope of SEACDT to prevent the loss of Southeast Asia as a result of the loss of South Vietnam, and to postpone indefinitely the elections proposed by Geneva Accords for Vietnam. ISA Letter to State Department, 22 Apr 55 | 923 |
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