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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 248. | In a debriefing, General Collins is firmly convinced that it will be to the detriment of U.S. interests to continue to support Diem. ISA Memorandum, 25 April 1955 | 937 |
| 249. | The U.S. tentatively proposes to maintain full support to Diem until an alternative supported by Bao Dai is developed. Dulles 4757 to Saigon, 27 April 1955 | 941 |
| 250. | The State Department is being forced to take a strong stand for Diem. Senator Mansfield is a strong backer of Diem and if Diem is forced out, there will be "real difficulties on the Hill." K.T. Young Memorondum for Robertson, 30 April 1955 | 945 |
| 251. | Bao Dai registers strong complaints against U.S. support of Diem, U.S. inaction which allowed the present civil strife, and against U.S. failure to urge Diem to go to France. Diem, in Bao Dai's opinion, is a "psychopath who wishes to martyrize himself." Paris 4746 to Dulles, 30 April 1955 | 948 |
| 252. | It is predicted that the success of Diem against the Binh Xuyen, Bao Dai, the French and General Vy has created a potentially revolutionary situation in Vietnam and, given U.S. support and French acquiescence, Diem is expected to stabilize the situation in Saigon. SNIE 63.1-2/1-55, 2 May 1955 | 955 |
| 253. | Tripartite discussions again reveal basic disagreement. The French conclude: "Diem is a bad choice…without him some solution might be possible but with him there is none…What would you say if we [France] were to retire entirely from Indochina…" SECTO 8, 8 May 1955 | 959 |
| 254. | The French are increasingly bitter toward Diem and convinced he must go. Steps are suggested to reconstitute a joint Franco-American approach to the situation. Among these are steps to reduce the French garrison in Saigon, replace Ely, and form a course of action after the crisis is over which persuades Diem to reorganize his government or else get rid of him. Saigon 5074 to Dulles, 8 May 1955 | 967 |
| 255. | The JCS reject both alternatives suggested by Dulles as solutions to the Vietnam problem. The JCS recommend that Dulles be advised that Diem shows the most promise for achieving internal stability, that the U.S. cannot guarantee security of French nationals, and that U.S. actions under SEATO could possibly replace FEC presence. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 9 May 1955 | 971 |
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