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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
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| 256. | A move to deal with Diem to protect French civilians in order to get the French to withdraw "would clearly disengage us from the taint of colonialism…" General Bonesteel Memorandum, 9 May 1955 | 975 |
| 257. | The recommendations of the report of the Military Staff Planners Conference, SEACDT and the recommended JCS actions are summarized. The basic report is omitted. See Document 257, page JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 2 June 1955 |
976 |
| 258. | The NSC recommends and President Eisenhower approves that NEC recommendations as to U.S. policy on all Vietnam elections are not required and that in the event of renewal of Communist hostilities U.S. policy would be governed by NSC 5429/5. Memorandum for the NSC (NSC 1415), 13 June 1955 | 984 |
| 259. | A summary of those portions of the Report of the Staff Planners Conference which have political significance are forwarded to the Secretary of State. The parts summarized concern terms of reference for military advisors organization to SEACDT, measures for improving defensive effectiveness through mutual aid and self-help, signal communications, and future organizational structure. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 1 July 1955 | 985 |
| 260. | In probable developments before July 1956, North Vietnam (DRV), though confronted by serious economic problems, will consolidate its control north of the 17th parallel. The DRV army has increased in strength but will probably not attack Laos before mid-1956. Tactics are likely to include activation of guerrilla units in South Vietnam and their reinforcement by infiltration from the North. NIE 63.1-55, 19 July 1955 | 993 |
| 261. | The consequences of selected U.S. courses of action are estimated in the event of Viet Minh aggression against South Vietnam. While overt aggression is unlikely, U.S. efforts at undertaking other steps to convince the Viet Minh that aggression will be met with intervention are expected to render overt aggression even less likely. Failure to intervene however, could signal an expanded Communist Chinese effort in Asia. SNIE 63.1-4-55, 13 September 1955 | 997 |
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TOP SECRET - Sensitive
