NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| Control: | 4065 |
| Rec'd: | MAY 8, 1955 |
| 9:12 PM |
| FROM: | PARIS |
| TO: | Secretary of State |
| NO: | SECTO 8, MAY 8, 5 PM (SECTION THREE OF THREE) |
PRIORITY
SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 8, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY SAIGON 716
is a chance but with Diem there is none.
Faure then concluded with the following significant statement: "Diem is a bad choice, impossible solution, with no chance to succeed and no chance to improve the situation. Without him some solution might be possible, but with him there is none. However, I cannot guarantee any other solution would work nor is it possible to clarify the situation. There seems to be fundamental disagreement between us. I could have claimed that since French position is predominant in Vietnam, you should accommodate your views more to ours, but I have rejected this. What should be done under the circumstances? What would you say if we were to retire entirely from Indochina and call back the FEC as soon as possible. I fully realize this would be a grave solution, as it would leave French civilians and Frence interests in a difficult position. There is also the question of the refugees' fate. If you think this might be a possible solution, I think I might be able to orient myself towards it if you say so. It would have advantage of avoiding all further reproach to France of "colonialism" while at the same time giving response to Diem's request that France should go. Since it contimplates the liquidation of the situation and the repatriation of the FEC, would the United States be disposed to help protect French civilians and the refugees? If you do not agree to this solution and believe it would hamper you, then we can have further discussions on the Vietnamese situation.
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