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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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SECTO 8, MAY 8, 5 PM (SECTION THHEE OF THHEE), FROM PARIS

Secretary replied that he appreciated frankness. It is only way friends should speak to each other. There is a fundamental difference between France and US. US has higher regard of Diem's capabilities than France. US informed "coup de force" was engineered by Binh Xuyen while French say otherwise. Secretary himself had had doubts that Diem could survive. It was questionable whether army was loyal to him and he did not control the National Police. Loyalty of French Govt itself in support of Diem was not questioned but there were difficulties from other sources such as Radio Francaise-Asie. US does not agree with French opinion of Diem. If he had been a non-entity he would have collapsed but he did not. He showed so much ability that US fails to see how he can be got rid of now. It is assumed that France would not wish to do so by force.

Diem is stronger now than when Bao Dai first withdrew his powers. Worst aspect is that problem involves difference of opinion between France and US. Vietnam is not worth quarrel with France. Common interests are to great to be jeopardized by difference of opinion on Vietnam. Secretary agreed with French statement that it must not affect Franco-US relations in other areas. If it would solve problem, US would withdraw and drop its support of Vietnam. Franco-US differences must be resolved now for Secretary did not believe that US Congress would continue with its present aid program otherwise. Substantial sums of 4 to 5 hundred million dollars are involved.

Choice open to US is to have Diem supported or to withdraw. It is grave problem which the secretary would like to think about overnight. French suggestions are serious and must be weighed carefully. Advice and counsel are needed. US interest in Vietnam is simply to withhold area from Communists. US will give consideration to any suggestion French make but must warn that US financial support may not be expected to any solution which Secretary can think of as alternative to Diem. Question must be taken up again tomorrow.

Macmillan stated that British interests in Vietnam were more indirect but nonetheless vital because (1) interest in area itself and (2) interest in Communist threat from any area in world. It would be grave error to reach decision that evening. Foreign ministers are to be in Paris several days and should look into matter again. Events might overtake our decisions. Accurate review of

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