Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 2.djvu/18

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


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(2) Force ratio - French between 1.5 and 1.6 to 1 Viet Minh; vis-a-vis regular forces in the Tonkin Delta, the ratio was reversed - approximately 1.15 Viet Minh to 1 French (NIE 5).
(3) Equipment status - French superiority, but Viet Minh improving due to Chinese aid.
(4) Mobility - Viet Minh superior; French roadbound.
(5) Strategy - French strategy lacking in aggressiveness, defensive, of doubtful value.
(6) Status of Vietnamese National Army - essentially none; "only a slight chance that the French can maintain their military position long enough"24 to build such an army.
(7) Relative capabilities - danger of a major military defeat of the French by the Viet Minh in Tonkin within six to nine months, which would jeopardize the French position in the remainder of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
b. The Economic and Political Situation

French resources badly strained; little or no real nationalist Vietnamese leadership, government; little popular support of Bao Dai regime25; political and economic situation generally poor.

c. French Objectives in Vietnam

French slowness and obstructionism over the years in creating a Vietnamese national government and national army (March 8, 1949, agreements were not ratified by France until February 2, 1950), and continued slowness in giving control of the bureaucracy to the Vietnamese, indicate a reluctant departure, if any departure, from colonial objectives.

d. French Resolve to Remain in Vietnam

"... there are grounds for questioning the French will to remain in Indochina."26

Thus, the American perception of the situation in Vietnam in 1950 was generally one of gloom, with little light at the end of the tunnel; in retrospect, it seems reasonably accurate.

6. The Decision to Assist France and the Associated States
a. French Request Aid

United States involvement in the bleak Indochinese situation was hastened when, on February 16, 1950, the French requested U.S. military

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