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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive
time), Ambassador Lodge forwarded a report of USOM provincial representative Young on the situation in Long An province as of 6 December. Part of that report was as follows:
(1) The only progress made in Long An province during the month of November, 1963 has been by the Communist Viet Cong. The past thirty days have produced a day-by-day elimination of US/Vietnamese sponsored strategic hamlets and the marked increase in Viet Cong influence, military operations, physical control of the countryside and Communist controlled combat hamlets.(2) At the end of September, 1963 province officials stated that 219 strategic hamlets were completed and met the 6 criteria. Effective 30 November 1963 this figure has been reduced to about 45 on the best estimates of MAAG, USOM and new province chief, Major Dao. Twenty-seven hamlets were attacked in November compared with a figure of 77 for June, This would appear to be an improvement. However, the explanation is a simple one: so many strategic hamlets have been rendered ineffective by the Viet Cong that only 27 were worth attacking this month...(4) The reason for this unhappy situation is the failure of the government of Vietnam to support and protect the hamlets. The concept of the strategic hamlet called for a self-defense corps capable of holding off enemy attack for a brief period until regular forces (ARVN, Civil Guard, or SDC) could come to the rescue. In hamlet after hamlet this assistance never came, or in most cases, arrived the following morning during daylight hours ...(5) Two explanations are presented for the lack of assistance: (a) there are not sufficient troops to protect key installations and district headquarters and at the same time go to the assistance of the hamlet, (b) Both official orders and policy prohibit the movement of troops after dark to go to the assistance of hamlets or isolated military posts...(9) The strategic hamlet program in this province can be made workable and very effective against the Viet Cong. But help must come immediately in the form of additional troops and new concepts of operation, not in the same reheated French tactics of 1954, beefed up with more helicopters and tanks. The hamlets must be defended if this province is not to fall under complete control of the Viet Cong in the next few months ...
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TOP SECRET – Sensitive
