Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. C. 1.djvu/50

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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In concluding, the Secretary said that his appraisal might be overly pessimistic, and that Lodge, Harkins, and Minh, while agreeing on specific points, seemed to feel that January might bring a significant improvement.

Following his report to the President, the Secretary made the following remarks to the press, at the White House:

...We have just completed our report to the President... We observed the results of the very substantial increase in VC activity, an increase which began shortly after the new government was formed, and has extended over a period of several weeks.

During this time, the Viet Cong have attacked and attacked successfully, a substantial number of the strategic hamlets. The rate of that VC activity, however, has substantially dropped within the past week to ten days.

This rapid expansion of activity, I think, could have been expected. It was obviously intended to take advantage of the period of organization in the new government. ..We received in great detail the plans of the South Vietnamese and the plans of our military advisors for operations during 1964. We have every reason to believe they will be successful. We are determined that they shall be. 28/

4. Efforts To Improve Intelligence On Progress Of The War

The Secretary had made evident in his memo of 21 December to the President that he had become seriously disturbed at the failure of the reporting system in Vietnam to alert him promptly to the deterioration of the situation there. CIA Director McCone had accompanied him on the trip to Saigon and, immediately upon his return, Mr. McCone initiated efforts to improve the reporting system. On 23 December he wrote the Secretary:

...information furnished to us from MACV and the Embassy concerning the current Viet Cong activities in a number of provinces and the relative position of the SVN Government versus the Viet Cong forces was incorrect, due to the fact that the field officers of the MAAG and USOM had been grossly misinformed by the province and district chiefs. It was reported to us, and I believe correctly, that the province and district chiefs felt obliged to 'create statistics' which would meet the approbation of the Central Government.

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