NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive
I believe it is quite probable that the same practice might be repeated by the new province and district chiefs appointed by the MRC... 29/
McCone, therefore, proposed development of a new covert method of checking on the information supplied by these regular reporting authorities on the progress of the war and on pacification and other counterinsurgency efforts. A plan was developed within CIA by 3 January 1964 which called for the formation of a mission of 10 to 12 experienced intelligence officers, all drawn from CIA, to proceed to Saigon for a 60 to 90 day TDY beginning about 12 January. There, under the direction of the CAS Station Chief, they would undertake:
1. A survey of Vietnamese/American counter-insurgency reporting machinery;
2. Develop, assess, and recruit new covert sources of information, to serve as a cheeky and finally,
3. Assist the station chief in developing recommendations, for submission to Washington through the Saigon country team, on means of improving overall GVN and US reporting machinery.
McCone forwarded these plans to McNamara on 7 January for discussion at a meeting that same day. 30/ Following the meeting of 7 January on this original proposal, a revised proposal was drawn up and submitted by McCone to McNamara for concurrence on 9 January. 3l/ The revision was largely responsive to a fear of the Secretary that, as originally proposed, the TDY team would serve as a sort of Inspector General functioning independently of both the Country Team and the CAS Station/Saigon. Accordingly the new draft expressly specified that a separate reporting system would not be established, nor a reorganization of the existing reporting system attempted. It would attempt, however, to develop through covert techniques a method of spot checking the accuracy of regular reporting and develop also new covert sources of information on the progress of the war.
In accepting the proposal in a written reply dated 16 January, Secretary McNamara expressed insistence on making this a team effort, first by emphasizing that "I do not believe that the team should have an inspectoral function for the overall reporting system," and second by adding to the draft submitted for his signature the clause, "but it should be a joint program involving all of the affected members of the country team." When the definitive messages went out to Saigon they had the concurrence of State, Defense and CIA. 32/
It is understandable enough from an administrative point of view that a formally coordinated unified effort seemed preferable. There had been notable discords, and failures of communication, and policy disagreement within the Mission in the past and these had caused serious problems. Important sources of disagreement remained, and
