Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 2. b.djvu/248

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

 

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d. The firmness of support of cur principal allies for our global policies generally and these courses of action in particular.

3. The military action, as proposed in NSC 124, would be limited as to its- objectives, but it would, not be subject to any geographic restrictions with respect to Communist China. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that any new communist aggression in Asia undoubtedly would stem from a deliberate design, in the formulation of which the possibility of counteraction by the United States against the source of aggression would, in all probability, have been considered.

4. The making of such a decision now or in the eventuality of overt aggression by Communist China against a country of Southeast Asia is complicated by, among other things, the following:

a. Whether or not the United Nations would be willing to call upon its members to engage in hostilities with Communist China;

b. Whether or not the member nations of the United Nations would be willing to engage in military action against aggression by Communist China in Southeast Asia;

c. Whether or not the United Kingdom and France would be willing to engage directly in military action against Communist China itself, other than action limited to the area of and/or the approaches to the land battle with the aggressor forces;

d. The ability and the willingness of the United States to take the military actions involved including unilateral action against Communist China itself, in event of Communist Chinese military aggression in the countries of Southeast Asia, Such actions would call for considerable increase over current military production rates with a corresponding curtailment of the production of goods for the civilian economy; until increased U.S. production is achieved, these actions would reduce the military assistance programs to other nations, especially those in high priority.

e. The possible effect upon United States alliances in Europe and upon the United Nations organization itself if the United States Government should consider it necessary, in its own interests, to take military action unilaterally against Communist China; and

 

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