NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
- f. The implications and the political effects of a probable refusal by the United States to provide ground forces for collective United Nations action or for combined military operations in support of France and the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia.
5. The basic decision, in light of the factors set forth in paragraph 3 above, those developed in NSC 124, and the military considerations set forth herein, is essentially political in nature. Its resolution will have direct bearing upon future United States global strategy. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that consideration by the members of the National Security Council itself of these factors and military considerations is necessary prior to any final decision regarding the policy statement in NSC 124.
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to report that, during the course of their preliminary discussions with representatives of the Chiefs of Staffs of the United Kingdom and France on the matter of possible courses of action to meet Chinese Communist aggression against Southeast Asia, the British and French military position, opposed even the concept of action against Communist China other than that limited to the area of, or approaches to, the land battle in opposition to the aggressor forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the British and French would, at least initially, oppose taking military action against Communist China as a nation, even in the face of aggression.
7. The British and French appear to think almost exclusively in terms of defense, at least as far as Europe and Southeast Asia are concerned. Their unwillingness to take even those measures for the defense of Southeast Asia which are within their capability, indicates that they may not recognize the actual long-term danger to themselves involved In the possible loss of Southeast Asia.
8. Piecemeal actions by Soviet satellites, such as the overrunning of Southeast Asia, can eventually lead to attainment by the USSR of its objective, among others, of dominating the continent of Asia and possibly the continent of Europe. It is emphasized that each Communist gain directly involves a loss to the Western World.
9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that there would be grave danger to United States security interests if Southeast Asia should pass Into the Communist orbit.
10. The military problems which would arise as a result
