2½ per cent. of the commerce of the Empire; and that this loss was partially made good by the prize ships and merchandise taken by its own naval vessels and privateers.' It should be further observed that the total number of vessels belonging to the British Empire rose from 16,875 in 1795 to 22,051 in 1805, and 23,703 in 1810. What was the result of the war to our opponent? Before the Revolution, Admiral de la Reveillere asserts that the commerce of France equalled that of England. The revolutionary war had not been long in progress before the French Directory was constrained to admit (in 1799) that 'not a single merchant-ship is on the sea carrying the French flag.' The history of the great war established beyond contravention the principle that no serious interruption to commerce is possible by the naval forces of a power which has not first obtained the command of the sea. It illustrates the fallacy of the idea that England can be reduced to scarcity while the relative strength of the two navies remains as it is now. On this point Admiral de la Reveillere is again worth quoting: 'S'imaginer que nous pourrons suffisamment bloquer les côtes anglaises pour reduire le pays à la famine … est une idée qui ne pénétrera jamais dans une tête saine.' In any future war in which the British Empire may become involved, British commerce will undoubtedly suffer losses; their number and extent will depend on the strength and efficiency of the British Navy; but it is only in the case of that strength being allowed to fall to a point which will leave the command of the sea in doubt that British commerce can be seriously interrupted. In such a case it is idle for British merchants to talk of securing the safety of their trade under a neutral flag.
