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"The total closure of the Tunnel by flooding can be effected by the simultaneous discharge of mines so placed that their explosion will open a direct communication between the bottom of the sea and the Tunnel.
"Any means for destroying the tunnel, by the combination of mines and flooding, should be controlled not only from the central work of the fortress, but also from one or more distant places, the communications from which to the mines would be quite distinct from those of the fortress" (p. 252).
The Committee were "of opinion that in adopting measures for securing a submarine tunnel against attack from without, it is imperative that the tunnel should emerge in the immediate vicinity of a first-class fortress, in the modern acceptation of the term, a fortress which could only be reduced after a protracted siege, both by land and sea" (p. 257).
The Committee then considered the two schemes, but could not recommend either of them "as at present planned" (p. 257).
They concluded their Report by saying, "They desire to record their opinion that it would be presumptuous to place absolute reliance upon even the most comprehensive and complete arrangements which can be devised, with a View of rendering the Tunnel 'absolutely useless to an enemy,' 'in every imaginable contingency'" (p. 258).
Admiral Sir A Cooper Key.
Letter to Lord Northbrook.
"I have observed with much surprise and regret, that the proposal to construct a Tunnel under the Channel, to unite England and France by a railroad, is becoming a reality, and that operations with this object have commenced" (p. 190).
"I consider all arrangements that are hinted at, by which the Tunnel, 200 feet below the surface, could be destroyed by dynamite or flooded by opening valves, are dangerous delusions, which would fail at the hour of trial" (p. 191).
"The only alternative is that we should maintain a standing army equal to those of other European nations."
