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Lord Wolseley.

(1).—Memorandum:—"The proposal to make a Tunnel under the Channel, may, I think, be fairly described as a measure intended to annihilate all the advantages we have hitherto enjoyed from the existence of the 'silver streak,' for to join England to the Continent by a permanent highway, will be to place her under the unfortunate condition of having neighbours possessing great standing armies, a state of things which prevents any of the Continental nations from disarming, as long as any one of them refuses to follow suit. The construction of the tunnel would place us under those same conditions that have forced the Powers of Europe to submit to universal service. It is to be hoped, therefore, that these measures may not be treated simply as 'private bills,' but that the question may be dealt with as one of great national importance" (p. 210).

"I do not think there is a naval or military man of any experience who does not consider that the construction of a Sub-marine Tunnel between England and France would introduce a new element of danger into the problem involved in the defence of England from invasion, although some may differ as to the extent of that danger. There may be some who will say, 'You can effectually counteract this danger, protect yourself against it, in fact, nullify it; 'but that the Tunnel does mean a new danger is virtually undisputed, and I believe that all thoughtful students of war will admit this to be the case. But whilst all will, I think, acknowledge that danger is involved in the scheme, a large number will go further, and will assert that, whatever precautions be taken, and even if it be assumed that more money is spent on fortifications than any British Cabinet is ever likely, in time of peace, to ask from Parliament, it will be impossible completely to provide against the risk. You may, by a very great outlay, of money, in the first instance, and a considerable annual expenditure on the maintenance of fortifications and on other necessary precautions, do a great deal to mitigate the evil; but you cannot remove it altogether, except by the creation of an army fully equal in every respect to that which France can put into the field, and I am sure the people