way ("horses and men in a pitiable condition," says the Union historian), having abandoned to the Confederates his trains, a great quantity of valuable ordnance stores and small arms, the captured negroes, one thousand prisoners, besides his killed and wounded, and thirteen pieces of artillery.[1]
Yet General Grant, to use his own phrase, felt "compensated," and the Confederates, forbearing to inquire too curiously into his reasons, were not dissatisfied, for the damage to the roads was soon repaired,
AND THE CAMP-WITS HAD GAINED ANOTHER JOKE—
the latter openly alleging that Wilson had given a striking example of what is known in strategy as moving on parallel lines, for that, after eagerly tearing up the road, he had been no less eager in tearing down the road.
I have dwelt thus at length, comrades, on these two attempts of General Grant to extend his left and cut Lee's communications, because they were the first of a series of like enterprises, and illustrate fairly the repeated disaster which befell him in his efforts to reach the Confederate arteries of supply.
Having made still another attempt on the 23d to extend the Sixth corps to the Weldon railroad, in which he suffered a loss of above five hundred prisoners, General Grant now sharply refused his left on the Jerusalem Plank Road, yet abated no whit the marvelous energy which he had displayed since his partial investment of the town. Early was at this time menacing Washington, uncovered by Hunter's extraordinary line of retreat, and thither, in obedience to urgent orders, Grant Dispatched the Sixth corps. But, at the same time, he directed his engineers to examine the whole front south of the James with a view to direct assault, and pushed forward vigorously to completion his works, which, when heavily armed with artillery, would be capable of assured defence by a fraction of his preponderating force, leaving the bulk of his army available for active operations on the adverse flanks, or, should occasion offer, for such assault as he contemplated. The latter stroke suited best the temper of the man, and the engineers reporting, after careful reconnoissance, the Bermuda Hundred front impracticable, but that held by Burnside's corps as favoring, under certain conditions, such enterprise, he determined to assault from that quarter.[2]
- ↑ Lee's official dispatch, July 1st, 1864.
- ↑ Grant's letter to Meade.—Report on the Conduct of the War (1865), vol. i, p. 42.
