opinion, which condemns manslaying as an infamous crime, as well as the organs of the law, which punish it as such, strongly on his side, while in the other case he finds himself confronted by certain traditional notions of society which are apt to protect the willful manslayer against social infamy as well as against the punishment provided by the law. And such traditional notions, and the practices which grow up under them, create a social atmosphere which most people, when they deliberate upon the choice of a new home or field of enterprise, prefer to avoid.
It has been suggested that this view of the case is practically controverted by the thousands of people of means who go into the mining regions of the far West to invest their capital there, although the homicidal use of the revolver and bowie knife is comparatively as frequent there as in the South, if not more so. But this fact does not impugn my argument in the least, for this simple reason: The law-abiding citizen who goes to the far West knows to an absolute certainty that the ruffianly state of society there is a thing of only a short duration; that, as immigration pours in it will very soon establish those habits of social order which its good elements bring with them, and that in introducing those habits there will only be a few lawless ruffians to put down, but no settled adverse public opinion or morbid social notions of any strength to overcome. This is a universal experience with which the law-abiding citizen going there is well acquainted, and, therefore, he is not deterred from going. But as to going to the South, he fears that he would find those social notions which furnish excuse and exemption from punishment to the manslayer as the principal obstacle to that good order which he considers essential to his well-being. This is the difference, and it is just this difference which, in its practical effects, tells so seriously against the South.
Now, as to the facts concerning homicides in the
