tions issued by the General Land Office to the local land officers. It was as follows: “In the adjustment of grants for railroads the principle has, until recently, prevailed that indemnity was allowed for all lands sold, reserved or disposed of within the granted limits, whether such sale, reservation or disposal occurred before or after the granting act; and the certifications and patents have been executed in conformity thereto. In accordance with the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston Railroad Company vs. the United States, it is held by the Department that indemnity can only be allowed for lands sold, reserved or disposed of in the granted limits by the General Government after the granting act and prior to the time when the railroad right attached, unless the grant be one of quantity specifically set forth in the act.” And to this I caused to be added a rule which arrested ever so much loose practice advantageous to the corporations, and which is still in force, to this effect: “In the adjustment of all grants it consequently becomes necessary to know for what lands lost in place the indemnity selections are made, and with the view to that end you will require the companies to designate the specific tracts for which the lands selected are claimed.” If you do not appreciate the bearing of this instruction, I am sure the land-grant railroads do.
It is clear, therefore, that far from trying to prevent the introduction of the principle set forth in Justice Davis's decision as the rule of Departmental action, I introduced it myself, and my rulings were made in accordance with it until the last months of my administration, when, in consequence of the protests of parties interested, and the arguments urged by respectable attorneys, the question was submitted to the Attorney-General, and I was overruled by him. Neither was his opinion only a suggestion that in view of conflicting decisions of the courts “it would
