has had to suffer for it, I have. How could I possibly be inclined to depreciate rather than commend the fruit of a victory so dearly bought? If there is a man in this country who praises every good thing done by this Administration with real gladness and who feels every one of its failures as painfully as if it were his own, I am that man. And I can assure you, the Independents generally are of the same way of thinking.
Now, as to my real opinion of the state and tendency of things, I see good reasons to fear that the President will finally sit down between two chairs, having done enough in the way of reform to exasperate the spoils politicians, but not enough to satisfy the reform sentiment and to make converts. There are two ways out of this dilemma. One is to throw all reformatory purposes overboard and to unite the party by satisfying the spoils politicians. This, however, will mean dishonor and certain defeat. The other is to follow a bold reform policy which will appeal to the best instincts of the people. This means a leadership which, the more determined and uncompromising it is, the more it will command popular respect and, probably, party following. Partisans are apt to submit to a leader who has the advantage of power and position, and whom they know they cannot subjugate. In any event such a policy will revive public confidence and win recruits of the best kind, and thus a good chance of victory.
The Democratic party is not as strong to-day as it was a year ago. The unfortunate practice of making removals upon the ground of secret ex-parte charges has much weakened it. The helplessness of the majority in the House presenting the spectacle of a party without a policy has weakened it still more. And I am afraid the Jefferson Davis business in the South, although some of the large Republican papers take a sensible view of it, has furnished to the demagogues just the political capital they wanted
