blemish was suffered to slip away; yet, without being in the least disposed to blame anybody, I regret it all the same on account of its moral effect.
But the Administration of President Cleveland will be judged according to the outcome of its reform policy. That is the criterion he set up for himself, and it is not likely to be superseded by any other issue. If the Administration succeeds in that, it will be voted a success; if it fails in that, a failure. And no plea as to the difficulties it had to contend with will materially affect the verdict of history, for the overcoming of those difficulties is just the problem to be solved. Nobody appreciates more highly than I do the honest and courageous efforts made. It would be a pity if they failed. But what troubles me is that the President seems to think he has to stoop down for the purpose of lifting up his party to his level. I have seen that sort of thing before. The danger is that he who thus stoops down may not be able to get quite straight up again himself.
I think it probable that President Cleveland considers me an extremist on this question. Now, you have known me six years in the Senate and four years in Executive office. Have I ever appeared to you like an impracticable visionary? Have you not rather found me on the whole to be a man of temperate judgment and conservative instincts? But I cannot disregard facts. I know from early observation that the “active politicians” of both parties, as a class, are deadly hostile to civil service reform. I know that nobody can remain true to that cause who makes his action dependent upon the consent of the “active politicians.” That reform can be carried out only if they are made to understand that it will be done whether they like it or not, and that the people will be appealed to over their heads. Every concession encourages them and increases their power of resistance. The
