days as a pharisaical assumption of superior virtue. He had, indeed, not repelled the advice of the party magnates on matters of public policy, but he had not diligently sought it, nor had he followed it when it ran counter to his own judgment. Most of the Democratic leaders, as well as of the party workers of less degree, had, therefore, concluded that he was not the kind of President they liked. Then, near the close of his first Administration, he had, in a very impressive manner, advanced the tariff question as the principal issue between the two great political parties—this also against the wish of some prominent Democrats, who predicted party defeat as a consequence.
In spite of all this his renomination for the Presidency in 1888 was a party necessity, and, therefore, a matter of course; for even the most discontented Democratic politicians had to admit that they could not refuse Mr. Cleveland a renomination without virtually disowning the first and only Administration the Democratic party could call its own since 1861, which would have been fatal. But, no matter for what reason, he was defeated in the election. Had he not been above the common run of party leaders, his position would then have been weak indeed. The party had paid off its debt to him by the renomination; and the prestige of a public man is usually greatly impaired by defeat.
Nor did he, during the four years of his retirement, do any of the things which, under such circumstances, the ordinary politician would have thought useful to repair his fortunes. He quietly practiced law. He did not pose as the central figure of public occasions to attract the public eye. He did nothing to regain the favor of those who manage party caucuses and conventions. In his own State he permitted the regular organization of his party to pass wholly into the hands of his enemies. He not only did not shape his utterances according to the
