the grandest thing ctcuted *s not superior to its Creator; hence we must conclude tfiat the greatest manifestation of benevolence and justice among men is inferior in scope to that of the Creator, even as man's wisdom and power are inferior to his. And thus we have before our mental vision the character and attributes of the great Creator. He is wise, just, loving and powerful ; and the scope of his attri- butes is, of necessity, immeasurably wider than that of his grandest creation.
But further : having reached this reasonable conclusion relative to the existence and character of our Creator, let us inquire, What should we expect of such a being? The answer comes, that the possession of such attributes reason- ably argues their exercise, their use. God's power must be used, and that in harmony with his own nature \visely, justly and benevolently. Whatever may be the means to that end, whatever may be the operation of God's power, the final outcome must be consistent with his nature and characler, and every step must be approved of his infinite wisdom.
What could be more reasonable than such exercise of power as we see mani festal in the creation of countless worlds about us, and in the wonderful variety of earth? What could be more reasonable than the creation of man, endowed with reason and judgment, capable of appreci- ating his Creator's works, and judging of his skill of his wisdom, justice, power and love ? All this is reasonable, and all in perfert accord with facts known to us.
And now comes our final proposition. Is it not reason- able to suppose that such an infinitely wise and good being, having made a creature capable of appreciating himself and his plan, would be moved by his love and justice to supply the wants of that creature's nature, by giving him some JIEVELATTQN? Would it not be a rctBonable supposition,
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