Case 1:22-cv-01564-BAH Document 21 Filed 04/05/23 Page 12 of 15
| II. | PLAINTIFF’S POLICY ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE COPYRIGHT ACT ARE IRRELEVANT AND WRONG |
Unable to harmonize this case with statute or precedent, Plaintiff resorts to diverting the Court’s attention to incorrect arguments about copyright policy and the purpose of the Act. See, e.g., Dkt. 18 at 1, 13 (suggesting that “this is perhaps the paradigmatic case … requiring purposive statutory interpretation”). Plaintiff asserts without support that any ambiguity as to the protectability of AI-created works should be resolved in light of the purpose of the statute, at least as Plaintiff sees it. See id. But any ambiguity in the statute would make it exceedingly difficult for Plaintiff to demonstrate that the Copyright Office’s human authorship requirement is arbitrary. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 985 (2005) (“Before a judicial construction of a statute … may trump an agency’s, the court must hold that the statute unambiguously requires the court’s construction.”).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s understanding of the Act’s purpose is incomplete. Plaintiff focuses narrowly on the creation of works and disclaims the importance of economic incentives for human creators. See Dkt. 18 at 13–14. Courts have recognized that the copyright system seeks a balance of the economic incentives for creators and the dissemination of works for the public good. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (exclusive right in intellectual property involves “a difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand”); Comput. Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992) (copyright law establishes a “delicate equilibrium” between incentivizing authors to create and avoiding “monopolistic stagnation”); see also Dkt. 17 at 35.
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