Case 1:22-cv-01564-BAH Document 21 Filed 04/05/23 Page 13 of 15
Even more significantly, Plaintiff’s claim that the Copyright Office’s conclusion here deserves no deference (beyond its own regulations) is contrary to the applicable standard of review and to the routine practice of Appellate Courts, including the D.C. Circuit, when considering copyright issues. The APA’s directive that agency action may be overturned only when “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” – not Plaintiff’s incorrect contention that any ambiguity must be resolved in his favor – must guide this case.[1] 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also, e.g., OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 349–50 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Ginsburg, J.) (reserving consideration of the question of the best way to interpret a provision of the Copyright Act for a case that was not an APA claim regarding refusal of registration, and limiting its inquiry to determining whether the Copyright Office acted arbitrarily); see also Custom Chrome, Inc. v. Ringer, No. CIV. A. 93–2634(GK), 1995 WL 405690, *6 (D.D.C. June 30, 1995) (stating that a plaintiff’s request for the court to interpret a section of the Copyright Act “clearly misconceived the function of this court” in the context of an APA claim regarding a registration refusal). Here, the Copyright Office’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. It was a well-reasoned decision based on the text of the Constitution and the Act, as well as Supreme Court and appellate decisions that uniformly support a human authorship requirement.
More broadly, courts routinely defer to the Copyright Office’s experience and expertise related to the interpretation and application of the Act. See, e.g., Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 836 F.2d 599, 609–10 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (giving deference to
- ↑ The Copyright Office’s human authorship requirement also satisfies the somewhat stricter Chevron standard, which obliges a court, ordinarily, to leave undisturbed a reasonable agency interpretation of a statute if Congress has not directly addressed the issue presented. See Agape Church, Inc. v. F.C.C., 738 F.3d 397, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
9
