see what benefit would accrue from shelling batteries in another quarter. When this assault was postponed, there was clearly no reason to attempt the destruction of works intended to resist entry by sea, and which could have little influence upon an army taking the city in rear.
From a naval point of view, however, the principal lesson taught by this episode is the strength exhibited by a few guns on high ground even when opposed by a powerful squadron. Fort Constantine must have succumbed in time, even as the forts at Acre were unable to withstand the heavy and rapid fire of our ships. But a single elevated battery is difficult to silence, and may defy the efforts of a fleet. This was perfectly well understood in the old wars, but the lesson had been forgotten, until it was once more brought home to us on this memorable occasion. Another point demonstrated was the disadvantage attached to joint enterprises under dual command. Of this we had not much previous experience, because in most of our struggles at sea we had fought single-handed. But the Franco-Spanish alliance, which was punished at Trafalgar, is an example of the doubtful strength of such combinations. How bitterly Villeneuve complained of his Spanish colleagues. No plans could be formed that were not liable to be disturbed by their different methods of business and organisation. One supreme chief is necessary to success, and should we ever engage in any maritime alliance again, there must be one head, recognised by both States, and invested with full authority over the whole force.
A more profitable service rendered by the navy in the
