boats had been provided. This omission strongly influenced the course of events.
On March 27th the fleet anchored in what was then the Danish port of Kiel. Our first object was to confine the enemy's vessels to the Baltic, so that their power of offensive action against our coasts and commerce might be neutralised. A blockade was therefore essential. A trial of strength between the two fleets was also desirable, as success in such an action would secure the same end more effectually. Attack on strong fortresses was deprecated as likely to damage the fleet without an adequate return. The nation, however, expected an attack on Cronstadt, no doubt with the recollection of Acre in its mind. But the conditions were very different. Not that the sea defences of Cronstadt at the declaration of war were of the formidable nature attributed to them, but because the neighbouring water was so shallow that the approach of large ships was a difficult matter. The want of gunboats capable of taking up advantageous positions within range of the forts was the reason given by Sir Charles Napier for abstaining from an attack on Cronstadt. He was unwilling to risk injury to his own squadron by such an operation while the Russian fleet was intact. It was no secret at Acre that he opposed the bombardment as most hazardous, but orders from England were imperative on that occasion. In the Baltic many of the ships were most indifferently manned, and kept the sea with difficulty. We were unable to prevent a junction between the Russian Squadrons at Sveaborg and
