482
INDEX.
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| |||
| Impracticability of removing the causes of faction, | 44 | ||
| A pure democracy admits of no cure for faction, | 45 | ||
| Checks and safeguards in a republic, | 46 | ||
| Superiority of a large over a small republic, | 47 | ||
| XI.—The utility of the union with respect to commerce and a navy, | 48 | ||
| Jealousy in Europe of our commercial tendencies, | 48 | ||
| Union will increase our power to obtain commercial privileges from other nations, | 49 | ||
| Union will enable us to maintain a navy, | 50 | ||
| Weakness and insignificance will result from disunion, | 50, 51 | ||
| Effect of a navy on our fisheries, | 51 | ||
| Union will increase the aggregate commerce of the states, | 52 | ||
| Union will give us the ascendant in the affairs of this continent, | 53 | ||
| XII.—The utility of the union with respect to revenue, | 54 | ||
| Prosperity of commerce a source of national wealth, | 54 | ||
| Commerce increases the means of revenue, | 54 | ||
| Revenue from direct taxation impracticable, | 55 | ||
| Impost duties must be relied on for revenue, | 55 | ||
| Union will facilitate the collection of such duties, | 55, 56 | ||
| Difficulty of separate States collecting such duties, | 56 | ||
| Necessity of revenue to a nation, | 57 | ||
| XIII.—The same subject continued, with a view to economy, | 58 | ||
| Union favorable to economy in public expenditure, | 58 | ||
| Probable confederations in case of disruption of the union, | 59 | ||
| Increased cost of separate governments, | 60 | ||
| XIV.—An objection drawn from the extent of country answered, | 60 | ||
| Practicability of extending the limits of a republic, | 60 | ||
| Distinction between a republic and a democracy in this respect, | 61 | ||
| Extent of the union compared with that of European states, | 62 | ||
| Jurisdiction of the general government limited, | 62 | ||
| Facilities of intercourse will increase, | 63 | ||
| Border states will need protection from the union, | 63 | ||
| Disunion more dangerous than union, | 64 | ||
| XV, XVI.—Concerning the defects of the present confederation, in relation to the principle of legislation for the states in their collective capacities, | 65 | ||
| Insufficiency of the confederation to preserve the union, | 65 | ||
| Disastrous results of its defects, | 66 | ||
| Increase of power in the national government necessary, | 67 | ||
| National legislation must act on individuals instead of states, | 67 | ||
| A league or alliance of states will be inefficient, | 68 | ||
| What is implied in a government, | 69 | ||
| Necessity of a controlling head to the confederation, | 70 | ||
| In a league of states, the only remedy for disobedience is force, | 72 | ||
| Difficulties involved in this remedy, | 72 | ||
| A military despotism would result, | 73 | ||
| Impracticability of sustaining the union by such means, | 73 | ||
| Superior facility with which a national government would execute its laws, | 74 | ||
| Or repress commotions, | 75 | ||
| XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX.—The subject continued, and illustrated by examples, to show the tendency of federal governments, rather to anarchy among the members, than tyranny in the head, | 76 | ||
| Danger of encroachment on states rights and powers, considered, | 76 | ||
| The danger of national weakness more to be feared, | 76 | ||
| Pervading influence of the local governments, | 77 | ||
| Illustration from the history of the feudal system, | 78 | ||
| Illustration from the history of the Grecian republics, | 79 | ||
| Illustration from the history of the Achæan league, | 81 | ||
| Illustration from the history of the Germanic body, | 84 | ||
