Index.
483
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| Illustration from the history of Poland, | 87 | ||
| Illustration from the history of the Swiss cantons, | 87 | ||
| Illustration from the history of the United Netherlands, | 89 | ||
| XXI, XXII.—Further defects of the present constitution, | 92 | ||
| Want of sanction to the laws, | 92 | ||
| Want of a mutual guaranty of the state governments, | 93 | ||
| Regulating state contributions to the treasury by quotas, | 94 | ||
| The proper remedy for this defect, | 95 | ||
| The want of a power to regulate commerce, | 96 | ||
| Difficulties arising from separate state regulations, | 97 | ||
| The raising of troops by quotas, | 98 | ||
| The right of equal suffrage among the states, an evil, | 98 | ||
| Requiring a vote of two-thirds of the states is not a remedy, | 99 | ||
| This principle gives scope to foreign corruption, | 100 | ||
| Instances from history of officers of republics corrupted by foreign powers, | 101 | ||
| The want of a judiciary power a crowning defect, | 102 | ||
| Necessity of a supreme tribunal, | 102 | ||
| Present organization of congress unsuitable for an executive head, | 103 | ||
| Propriety of the constitution being ratified by the people rather than by the states, | 103 | ||
| XXIII.—The necessity of a government, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, | 104 | ||
| Necessity of union for the common defence, | 104 | ||
| Power to raise armies and fleets necessary, | 104 | ||
| Powers of the present confederation insufficient, | 105 | ||
| A weak government unsafe, | 106 | ||
| The powers must be co-extensive, with the objects of government, | 107 | ||
| XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII.—The subject continued, with an answer to an objection concerning standing armies, | 108 | ||
| The constitution vests the power of raising armies in the legislative and not the executive branch, | 108 | ||
| Standing armies not prohibited by the state constitutions, | 109 | ||
| Nor by the articles of confederation, | 109 | ||
| Dangers of invasion from foreign countries or savage neighbors, | 110 | ||
| Necessity of national troops to protect commerce, | 111 | ||
| Difficulty of separate states protecting the frontiers, | 112 | ||
| Armies of separate states more dangerous to liberty than those of the nation, | 113 | ||
| Objections to restrictions on the power of the government as to armies, | 113 | ||
| Militia cannot be relied upon alone for national defence, | 114 | ||
| Armies sometimes necessary in time of peace, | 115 | ||
| Danger of making the government too feeble by restrictions, | 116 | ||
| Vesting the power to raise armies in the legislature is a sufficient safeguard, | 117 | ||
| Effect of the limitation of appropriations to two years in the new constitution, | 118 | ||
| Liberty cannot be subverted, nor large armies raised, without time, | 119 | ||
| Dangers from armies less in a united than a disunited state, | 120 | ||
| The idea that the laws of the union cannot be executed without force unfounded, | 121 | ||
| The national government will be as well administered as state governments, | 121 | ||
| It will be strengthened by extending into internal affairs, | 122 | ||
| And by operating on individuals rather than states, | 123 | ||
| The force occasionally necessary to execute the laws, an argument for union, | 124 | ||
| The same necessity for force might exist in case of several confederacies, | 125 | ||
| Union the best safeguard against the representatives of the people usurping power, | 125 | ||
