The Court of Star Chamber. jurisdiction by the Star Chamber till 1350, when the Commons petitioned : " Qe nul franc homme ne soit mys a respondre de son franc tenement ne de riens que touche vie et membre byns ou redemptions par apposailles " (informations) " devant le conseil nre seignur le Roi, ne devant ses ministres quecumques sinoun par proces de lay de ces en arere use." The answer was : '• II plest a nre seignur le Roi q les leies de son Roiaume soient tenuz et gardez en lour force, et q nul homme soit tenu a respondre de son fraunk tenement sinoun par processe de ley; mes de chose que touche vie ou membre contemptz ou excesse soit fait come ad este use cea en arere." "This," says Sir James Fitz-James Ste phen, " seems to be an express recognition of the fact that for at least 135 years after Magna Charta the criminal jurisdiction of the council was undisputed." Either in the same or in the next Parlia ment a similar petition was granted without any reservation, and this led to the statute printed as 25 Edw. III. Stat. 5, c. 4. Simi lar statutes were passed in 1354 (28 Edw. III. c. 3), and in 1368 (42 Edw. III. c. 3). On two occasions in the reign of Henry IV., two in the reign of Henry V., and one in the reign of Henry VI., petitions were made by Parliament with a view of limiting the powers of the council, but none of them resulted in the passage of a statute, the answers given by the king being either unfavorable or qualified. Some of these petitions and the answers show that the ground on which the jurisdiction of the council was defended was the difficulty in many instances of obtaining redress for in juries at the common law. Thus in 1399 (1 Henry IV.) the Com mons petitioned that personal actions be tween party and party may not be tried by the council, to which the answer was : " Soit l'Estatut eut fait tenuz et gardez, la ou l'une partie est si graunt et riche, et l'autre partie si povre qu'il ne purra autrement avoir
165
recoverer." The word " except " (supplied by Sir F. Palgrave after " gardez "), appears to be lacking. The jealousy of the power of the council entertained during the fourteenth century was justified by the improvement of the judicial, polity compared with what it had been in times past. The judicature of the king in council had been admitted in past times for wise reasons, although as wise ones might now be urged for it abrogation. It was principally calculated for times of dis order when the common course of justice was circumscribed to very narrow bounds, and ordinary judges were unable to enforce the execution of the law against powerful subjects. When the state of society was al tered and things grew more settled, such supreme power seemed no longer necessary. Again, the common law, during this period, had arrived at such a degree of perfection that arguments from the incompetency or defect of ordinary provisions were no longer of any avail. The remedies of the law were so increased in number and their execution so effectually secured that it was no longer requisite to recur to the judicial character of the king to supply by his prerogative the insufficiency of the law. All injuries now found a means of redress in the ordinary courts, and to recur to any other jurisdiction was thought unnecessary, dangerous and burdensome to the subject. Such arguments, co-operating with the dread impressed by an authority that was as much or more perhaps of a political than judicial nature, contributed to raise a clamor against the council, and occasioned several acts of Parliament which contributed to dis countenance any unnecessary application to the king in council, and allowed it only on such terms as it was thought might prevent an abuse of it. The first of these statutes was the 25th Edw. III. Stat. 5, c. 4, which enacted that according to the Great Charter none shoidd thenceforth be taken by petition or sugges
