patch; he held that he went from Cienfuegos to the point he reached, twenty-two miles south of Santiago, with as much despatch as was possible while keeping his squadron to gether. They did not expressly mention his blockade of Santiago as such; he held expressly that the blockade of Santiago was effective. All of these opinions of Admiral Dewey, except the first, concerning the pas sage from Key West to Cienfuegos, and the last, already mentioned, concerning com mand and credit, seem to be rather in the nature of explanations intended to give what he regard ed as a just report of Commodore Schley's conduct, than to hold that such conduct was what he should have himself advised. No one familiar with the proceedings of civil courts, and accustomed to respect and to submit to their judicial rules, can regard the dissenting member's statement concern ing command and credit as other than a de parture from the legal principles that govern courts of law and equity. But, since this is the act of a military judge acting under great responsibility, it must be studied with regard to military practice; and it is not wholly without precedent for a military judge, in a court of inquiry, to cut short or to exclude evidence even upon points at issue, as well as to admit evidence contrary to the rules of civil courts, as the quotations given below from General Sherman abun dantly show; especially when he said to counsel offering evidence, " We have heard enough on that point." No lawyer, as such, can be expected to ad vise such practice even in military courts; and the fact is, that when a military judge decides to exclude or to admit evidence con trary to civil rules, he does not usually pro fess to follow, even if he asks, the advice of the Judge Advocate. He uses his power as General Sherman clearly declared, but he uses it subject to disapproval by the review
ing officer. From this point of view, the meaning of Admiral Dewey's expression may be as follows: — Without regard to what was excluded, or to any other person or any other interest, and with sole regard to Commodore Schley's conduct and the evidence admitted, this court has the power to report, as a fact or as its opinion on the evidence, what the ap plicant's rank and responsibility were in the fight; and, as one of its members, the pre siding member does report that the evidence before the court proves who was in com mand, and who is entitled to the blame or the credit for what was done during such command. And this being so, the presid ing member reports the facts, his opinion, and his recommendation as to what he thinks was so proved. The implied disapproval of this act of such a president of such a court by a Secre tary of the Navy of such exceptional experi ence in peace and war, in legal and in military affairs, is a precedent which fixes a bell buoy, even if it does not mark a dis tinct advance in the legal character of courts of inquiry.- It is also according to the long efforts of the Judge Advocate Ceneral ot the Navy to maintain in our military courts much practical regard for the well-tried rules of civil courts. The detailed examination by the President of the United States upon the appeal, and his opinion, confirm substantially the decision of the Secretary of the Navy. The President's recognition of the point of command and credit as " raised by the president of the court" does not conflict with the Secretary's decision, which did not dispute the authority, as distinguished from the propriety, of the dissenting member to go to that extent in his expressions under the precept. The point may be fine, but it is necessary in order to understand the military system as illustrated by this case.
