the usual begging of the question by an honest person unaccustomed to such exam ination and especially by a person accus tomed to command. Admiral Howison answered that, if a man is commander-inchief, somebody must prove that he is not. Then followed some discussion, in which the Judge Advocate said, "I assisted in prepar ing the specifications." Mr. Rayner: "We did not," and remarked upon a comparison between the conduct of Schley and Sampson. The Judge Advo cate said that it was not a question of com parison. Mr. Rayner then said, "We intend to prove that Admiral Sampson was not at the battle of Santiago at all," and added that "It becomes a question who was the comman der-in-chief. ... If Admiral Howison has expressed an opinion, we have the burden of proving innocence." Mr. Rayner then asked Admiral Howison whether he had not, to one of the three wit nesses, or to any one else, expressed an opinion as to Admiral Sampson's having commanded at Santiago and deserving the credit for the victory. Admiral Howison replied, "It is gener ally understood" that Admiral Sampson was, and added "I have not seen the official reports. I have not made up my mind, be cause I do not know the circumstances." During the argument which followed, Mr. Rayner was saying that, according to one of the witnesses. Admiral Howison had spoken of coaling at sea and of disobedience, when Admiral Howison interrupted Mr. Rayner, and said, "I do not like positively to deny the words of these gentlemen that came here. They are not exactly under oath, neither am I. They should be believed just as much as myself. I do not like to be so positive;" then he added that the witness quoted "must be mistaken as to coaling." Mr. Rayner re plied, "I am perfectly willing to believe every word you say," and added that the ob jection was entirely on the basis of Admiral I
Howison's own statement. Mr. Rayner then made his argument, and compared the challenged member to a challenged juror who has an opinion which requires evidence to remove it, and said it was safer to ex clude him. The Judge Advocate then advised the court that it was in order for the unchal lenged members to withdraw. Accordingly, a recess was ordered. Upon the reassembling of the court, the president stated that the objection to RearAdmiral Howison as a member of the court was sustained, and that he was therefore ex cused. The court was then adjourned without day, to await the action of "the convening authority," and the president of the court wrote to the Secretary of the Navy informing him of the objection, and of its having been sustained, and of the adjournment subject to instructions. It is worth noting here that at the courtmartial of Captain David Porter1 of the United States Navy, he challenged the Judge Advocate as biased, and so unfit to act as such officer. The court asked the advice of the Judge Advocate himself upon the point. The Judge Advocate replied, the accused has no right to except to the Judge Advo cate, and the court has no right to decide on any exception to the Judge Advocate. No precedent has been of such a thing. The court opened and announced its denial of Captain Porter's challenge. The Judge Ad vocate then proceeded and tried the case. Some readers will probably agree with the following remarks of the late author, J. Fenimore Cooper, concerning certain supposed prejudice on the part of members of the court-martial which tried Captain Macken zie, but the present writer thinks the view mistaken. Mr. Cooper wrote: "This is one of the evils which result from the encroach ments of the press, which will soon over shadow all that is left of justice in the coun1 Court-Martial, 7 July, 1825.
