A Legal View of the Schley Inquiry. try, unless checked. The record of no court of inquiry ought to be published until the case is finally disposed of, nor, as we think, the evidence in any trial. Nothing is gained by it but catering to a vicious taste or mor bid curiosity, while much may be lost to the rightful administration of justice."1 A taste for understanding how solemn acts of government are done is not vicious, and the surest way to gratify it is at the moment when it is being done. Curiosity as to how we are governed is not morbid. If there is any tendency which would increase vice and morbidness, it is a want of such taste and such a curiosity. The press, newspapers in cluded, with all its faults, increases the influ ence of both civil and military courts, and while doing much injustice does more good than harm to the administration of justice. On the 20th of September the court again assembled, Rear- Admiral Francis M. Ram say being present. The Judge Advocate read a letter of 13th of September, from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, appointing Rear-Admiral Ram say in place of Howison relieved. The Judge Advocate inquired of the ap plicant whether there was any objection; to which the applicant replied, "None." The president and the other members of the court were then sworn by the Judge Ad vocate, and he was sworn by the president in the presence of the applicant. Several persons were sworn as stenogra phers. The Judge Advocate read a letter from the president of the court to the Secretary of the Navy, requesting that the court be fur nished with all the documentary evidence on the files of the Department relating to the matter under inquiry, and the reply stating compliance and offering attention if further documents should be required. 1 Review of the Proceedings of the Naval Court Mar tial in the case of Alexander Slidell Mackenzie, a Com mander in the Navy of the United States. By James Fenimore Cooper. (New York, 1844.) •U. S. N. Reg., 1792.
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The Judge Advocate advised the court that it was in order for the court to with draw to discuss its order of procedure. The court withdrew. Upon reassembling, the Judge Advocate asked whether the applicant had anything to offer as to the method of conducting the in quiry, whether the applicant would begin or the Judge Advocate should begin. Judge Wilson said, "Go right along, Mr. Judge Ad vocate." Whereupon, the Judge Advocate pro ceeded to put in his case.
RULINGS AND ARGUMENTS. The most of the rulings were upon points of practice, as might be expected in a court appointed for a single case only. The most of the discussions concerning what rul ings should be given were about the admis sibility of opinions. About an equal number of points were raised, by one side or the other, concerning hearsay. The rulings which limited the scope of the reports of the court, and thus affected the nature of the inquiry more than any other rulings, were those which excluded questions intended to raise comparisons between the conduct of Admiral Schley and Admiral Sampson, as to the blockade; and as to neither having tried to destroy the "Colon," when she was lying at the mouth of the harbor; and as to facts leading to the question of command at the battle of Santiago. But one of the peculiarities of the case is that the applicant's counsel postponed and finally omitted de bate which would have required an expressly clear ruling as to whether command was or was not in issue. They took the risk of the possible uncertainty of arbitrary rulings on evidence. This policy may have helped them to divide the court. The arguments of the counsel for the ap plicant mean substantially, in brief, that dur ing the entire time under examination he had much discretion, which he used reasonably,
