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The Recognition of Panama and lis Results. in terms so clear and unmistakable that no doubt as to its meaning can exist. Does the President's argument accord with this rule? The message announces that after the new republic was started "the United States gave notice that it would per mit the landing of no expeditionary force, the arrival of which would mean chaos and destruction along the line of the railway and of the proposed canal, and an interruption of transit as an inevitable consequence." In effect, he says that as the United States is bound to protect the Panama railway and the zone it traverses from injury, and as the reestablishment of Colombian authority over the rebellious Isthmus, including this zone, might jeopardize this railway, therefore Co lombia shall be prevented from that primary exercise of a State's sovereignty, the right to put down insurrection. Was the treaty provision inserted to limit Grnnadian sovereignty or to maintain that sovereignty? Was a property rieht clearly intended and stated to be granted in the treaty? Is the idea that an obligation to pro tect the property of a friendly State substi tutes fhe rights of the protector tor the rights of the sovereign, consonant with either law or common sense? Does any reasoning man believe that the President's construction of the treaty of 1846 can be written into it by any other hand than the mailed fist? The message goes on to adduce authorities for its interpretation of the treaty. Let us examine them, remembering, however, that the opinions of Secretaries of State have no inherent judicial or legal value. Secretary Cass in 1858 wrote of the narrow portion of Central America: "While the rights of sovereignty of the States occupying this region should always be respected, we shall expect that these rights be exercised in a spirit befitting the occasion and wants and circumstances thai have arisen. Sovereignty has its duties as well as its rights."

The quotation goes on at some length to declare that no local State would be per mitted to bar intercourse or make it unduly burdensome. The letter (to Mr. Lámar) was aimed at exactions in the shape of port dues and tolls forbidden by treaty. Mr. Cass also deprecated European influences in that quar ter, as well as local disturbance. The Panama railway was then part of our easiest route to California, and we were naturally sensitive as to its unobstructed use. The language of the letter is general and vague. It was far from having any such meaning as the Presi dent imagines. But it was explicitly insisted that the rights of sovereignty of the Central American States must be respected. It there fore condemns our recent action. Mr. Cass' deliberate opinion is expressed elsewhere. In 1857 he negotiated a claims convention with New Granada, providing (Art. i) for the ref erence of claims "for damages which were caused by the riot at Panama on the I5th of April, 1856, for which the said government of New Granada acknowledges its liability, arising out of the privilege and obligation to preserve peace and good order along the transit route," a full acknowledgment of Granadian sovereignty and responsibility in the Isthmus. The President next quotes Secretary Seward, in 1865: "The United States have taken and will take no interest in any question of internal revolution in the State of Panama, or any State of the United States of Colombia, but will maintain a perfect neutrality in connec tion with such domestic altercations." Can the President say as much? It is a queer citation for his purpose. Mr. Seward goes on to declare our right of protection under the treaty, and gives his interpretation of the ambiguous last phrase of the 35th arti cle, which has been cited but not commented on above: "The purpose of the stipulation was to guarantee the Isthmus against seizure or invasion by a foreign power only."