But it is probable that the President, although citing this dubious support to his interpretation and action, does not after all base the justification of that action upon the 1846 treaty. He appeals rather to a variety of considerations which are of greater or less force, and which, taken together, are held to give the United States an equitable right to do what it will in the matter of Panama and a Panama canal, because what it wills is just. The argument in the President's mes sage is substantially as follows: A fair and even generous canal treaty was made last year with Colombia, a country oft disturbed by popular risings, and no better than it should be. This treaty failed of the ratification by Co lombia which it deserved, and would have had, had the government chosen. In consequence, a revolution broke out at Panama, "and with astonishing unanimity the new republic was started." To allow the landing of Colombian forces to quell this rebellion "would mean chaos and destruction along the line of the railway and of the proposed canal, and an interrup tion of transit as an inevitable consequence," hence it was forbidden. Colombia being thus held incapable of re covering its power, the new State was recog nized, and the parent advised in all friendli ness to settle her differences with the tri umphant rebel. The "interests of civilization" demand that the Isthmus traffic shall not be disturbed any longer by unnecessary and wasteful civil wars. Colombia alone is incapable of maintaining order on the Isthmus, and has constantly to fall back upon the aid of the United States. When at last there was an opportunity to repay the United States for these many ser vices. Colombia offensively refused. Therefore it would be "folly and weak ness" and "a crime against the nation" if we do not set up this puppet State, and thus
carry out the great enterprise of building the interoceanic canal. It is "a project colossal in its size, and of well-nigh incalculable possibilities for the good of this country and the nations of man kind." This was the argument and the conclusion. Accordingly, without stopping to take breath, the administration made a canal treaty with Panama "better in its terms" than those with Nicaragua and Costa Rica or the one which Colombia rejected. Translated into every-day speech—and every day one hears just such sentiments— we gave Colombia fair terms, she tried to "hold us up," we set up a State which we could manage, and now Colombia pays the penalty of overreaching herself. This sort of argument will appeal to men differently. One or two facts are clear about it. One is, that it does not regard Colombia as a sovereign State under constitutional government. The charge that treaty ratifi cation there is at the President's will; the idea that frequent revolutions in a State detract from its sovereignty; the denial to a State of the right to quell insurrection, are proofs of this. Another fact is, that it is not a case where law enters, but only politics. The moving considerations are purely material. It is the interests of civilization that are appealed to, the world's need of a colossal public work, not the reign of law and the equality of States. Old precedents have been disregarded and new ones made. These carry us far towards the theory that to the United States belongs such headship of the States on this continent as to make its own sense of justice, its own will, the only law. To claim such powers without being held to corresponding respon sibilities for our weaker neighbors' actions is impossible. There lias been indecent and unnecessary haste, judged by our own or any other stan
