THE APPLICABILITY OF ENGLISH METHODS march of events, as population and busi ness increase, more and more litigation naturally results. But the increased de mands of the people in the matter of trial of causes have not resulted in correspond ingly enlarged facilities for the speedy dis position of legal business. The crude sys tem of twenty-five or fifty years ago still prevails to-day in most of the United States. The Comity Court, described by Mr. Crane, is evidently a distinct success in England. This court has been adopted in some of the United States, and with partial success. In South Carolina the state constitution provides that any county of the state, upon a favorable vote on the question by the people, may provide for a county court. The constitutional limitations as to the jurisdiction of this court, however, are such that the County Court is not regarded with favor in this state, and not a single county has provided itself with such a court. Furthermore, the salary provided for the county judge is only $800, and is too small to enable a county to obtain the services of the best talent. Contrast the salaries paid in England to the county judge, £1500 (the equivalent of about $7,500). The effectiveness of the County Court in other states is doubtless greatly impaired by the same difficulties prevailing in South Caro lina. Summary Judgment. — The provision for a summary judgment under Order in, Rule 6, of the Rules of Procedure of the High Court of England, is novel and interesting. Upon first consideration one is inclined to disfavor this device for a speedy recovery of a judgment, on the ground that the defendant's interests might be summarily disregarded. And yet there is ample pro vision in the rule for the protection of the defendant. If he is in earnest in a righteous defense every opportuntiy is given for a full hearing. The effect of the rule is merely to eliminate sham defenses intended for delay. The dilatory process of our courts is often a powerful and effective weapon
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of offense and defense for the defendant. By this scheme the recovery of judgment on notes, accounts, and other ordinary money demands is greatly facilitated. Of course this rule for summary judgment can be applied only to a limited class of cases; but still it is effective for a great deal of ordinary litigation. This rule of the High Court is a simple one. It is practical and businesslike. I am inclined to consider it one of the most powerful agencies that can be devised for the acceleration of the trial of causes. A similar provision should be adopted in every state. Summons for Directions. — From Mr. Crane's article it appears that under the rules of the High Court of England, "the plaintiff must in every action, except an admiralty action, take out a summons for direction, that is, a summons or applica tion asking the judge to give directions as to the future conduct of the proceedings. On the hearing of the application either party may ask for such directions as he desires, but the judge is not bound to give the directions asked for, but has the fullest discretion to make such order as may be just with respect to all the interlocutory proceedings." Upon such application the judge determines all questions of plead ing, mode, and place of trial, and in fact all interlocutory matters connected with the cause. Such a practice is no doubt con ducive to speed in the trial of causes. The evils of exasperating delays sometimes re sulting from interlocutory proceedings in a cause could be, to some extent at least, cured by a "Summons for Directions." In our practice these summons could be directed to a judge at Chambers, and all incidental matters having been settled by the judge, the trial of the cause on its merits would proceed without delay. Absolute Control of the Judge over the Cause List. — "The moment a case is set down for trial it is absolutely under the control of the trial judge, and counsel have no power to delay it as of right or simply
