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for their convenience. Applications to have causes 'stand over' or to 'postpone to next term,' or to take some other place in the list, by agreement of counsel, which are so frequent in the American courts, and which are there generally granted as a matter of course, are seldom heard in the English courts." The easy-going delays from continuance of causes are so frequent in American courts that we are inclined to regard them as necessary evils which we will have with us always. And yet our kinsmen across the sea seem to have demon strated to us that it is possible to require the prompt trial of causes, and to place court business upon a strictly business basis. And why should it not be so? There is no reason other than the fact that defendant's counsel proverbially wishes to postpone the evil day as long as possible. Crowded dockets should be thinned out, and causes stricken off without ceremony or else tried promptly. The evil of continuances seems to be strictly an American institution. It is deep rooted, and clings to our judicial system like a barnacle to the hull of a ship. But unlike the barnacle this evil seems never destined to be scraped off. No Bill of Exceptions. — From Mr. Crane's article it appears that in England in case of an appeal no bill of exceptions is allowed to be submitted in the Appellate Court. "As there is no bill of exceptions," says Mr. Crane, "there is no temptation to cast a fine mesh drag-net in the hope of catch ing a sprat which may stick in the maw of a judge." I must confess that I cannot conceive how such a practice would be beneficial to our system. In this state, and possibly in every state of the Union, ftie exceptions are the backbone of the appeal. Without exceptions there is no appeal. These exceptions are intended to eliminate all immaterial questions and tend to sim plify the trial in the Appellate Court. It seems to me that the exceptions could not be dispensed with advantageously.
Infrequent Remands for New Trial. —
One of the most radical differences between the English and American systems perhaps lies in the power of the Appellate Courts. "In England," says Mr. Crane, "the Appeal Court has, over any action or matter brought before it on appeal, all the powers, autho rity and jurisdiction conferred by law on the trial judge. It can amend the plead ings, enlarge time, receive fresh evidence, draw inferences of fact, direct issues to be tried or accounts and inquiries to be taken, and generally it has power to give any judgment and make any order which ought to have been made in the court below. Even if there was error at the trial the court will not grant a new trial unless, in the opinion of the court, substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has thereby been occasioned in the trial. If by reason of error a wrong judgment was entered be low, the Appeal Court will not in revers ing that judgment remand the case for a new trial, but it will enter such judgment as in its opinion meets the justice of the case. How this practically works may be demonstrated by the fact that in 1904 the Appeal Court heard 555 appeals. Of these 182 were allowed, 339 were dismissed, and in 34 the judgment or order of the court below was varied. But of the 182 allowed, including applications for new trials and appeals from final judgment, only seven were remanded for new trial before a jury or for the trial judge's further considera tion." In the American states the jurisdiction. of the Appellate Court is generally limited merely to the correction of errors in the proceedings of the court below. The cause is remanded for a new trial, or for further proceedings, or dismissed as the case may be. Except in equity causes the court will not review the facts. In England the Appel late Court may review the facts in any cause, whether in law or equity. In many states the verdict of the jury settles finally the questions of fact in a law case. There is no good reason why it should be so.
