NOTES OF RECENT CASES OF IMPORTANCE FROM THE NATIONAL REPORTER SYSTEM (Copies of the pamphlet Reporters containing full reports of any of these decisions may be secured from the West Pub lishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota, at 25 cents each. In ordering, the title of the desired case should be given as well as the citation of volume and page of the Reporter in which it is printed.)
CHINESE EXCLUSION. (RIGHT OP ENTRY — ADOPTED CHILDREN OF MERCHANT) U. S. D. C. S. D. OF NBW YORK. AND
U. S. D. C. E. D. OP PENNSYLVANIA. Two cases, which are related in a general way and which present hitherto unadjudicated states of facts, are contained in No. 6, of Vol. 134 Fed eral Reporter. Both relate to the status of chil dren of Chinese merchants. The first case is that of Ex parte Fong Yim and others, 134 Fed. Rep. 938. The question involved in this case was whether adopted children of a Chinese merchant were entitled to admission into this country. There appears to have been some slight conten tion as to whether under the same circumstances, natural children would have been entitled to ad mission, it being contended that as the children had never before entered this country, they stood on the same footing as ordinary Chinese persons who had acquired no right of domicile. This question, however, is disposed of very briefly by the observation that the father has a right of entry and that their right to enter is incident to his right. The real question in the case is, as the court observes, whether a domiciled merchant in this country has the same right to bring in his adopted children as he has to bring in his natural children. The inspector, in rendering his deci sion to the effect that the children were not en titled to enter, stated that it did not seem to him that the law contemplated covering such cases, as that would give all domiciled merchants an opportunity to adopt children at will and bring them into this country. ' The court concedes that if the question of fact as to whether the adoption was bona fide should be decided adversely to the persons claiming a right of entry, they should be excluded. It appeared in the case under con sideration, however, that the adoptions occurred many years ago; that the children had ever since lived with and been supported by the adopting parents and that children could be adopted in China substantially without legal formalities, after, which their rights and obligations were similar to those of natural children. Under these circum stances, it is held that there is no difference be tween the legal status of adopted children and of natural children. The other case referred to is that of United States v. Joe Dick, 134 Fed. 988. Joe was born in China and was originally admitted to the country as a
son of a domiciled Chinese merchant. Afterward, while Joe was still a minor, the father returned to China and on Joe's refusal to accompany him, he was, as the court puts it, "turned loose upon the world to shift for himself." Afterward, Joe be came a laborer. Under these circumstances, Joe contended that the status which he originally acquired as the son of a resident Chinese mer chant continued even after the severance of all relations between himself and his father. It is held, however, that the continuance of his original status depended upon the continuance of the family relation and ceased when that relation was ended. "It would," says the court, "be the merest fiction to look upon him as a minor son in the household of his merchant father when he was in fact no longer in the household, but was making his own livelihood and his father was no longer a merchant nor even a resident in the United States." CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (PEONAGE — PRO HIBITORY STATUTE) UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. The constitutionality of the Federal Legislation prohibiting peonage, and incidentally the elements of proof necessary to support a conviction under an indictment for violation of those statutes, is considered in Clyatt v. United States, 25 Supreme Court Reporter, 429. U. S. Rev. St. §§ 1990, 5526 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 1266, 3715), de clare that the holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as "peonage" is abolished and forever prohibited, and that every person who holds, arrests, returns, or causes to be held, arrested, or returned, or in any manner aids in the arrest or return of any person to a condi tion of peonage, shall be punished by a fine of not less than $1000 nor more than $5000, or by im prisonment for not less than one year nor more than five years, or by both. The defendant Cly att was indicted for violation of these statutes. In considering the authority of Congress under the constitutional grants of power to enact this legislation, the court defines "peonage" "as the status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master," and quotes from the opinion of Judge Benedict in Jaremillo v. Romero, i N. M. 190, where it is said with respect to peonage: "One fact existed universally — all were indebted to their masters.
