390
THE GREEN BAG
This was the cord by which they seemed bound to their master's service." The difference be tween voluntary and involuntary peonage is noted by the court, and it is said that this is simply a difference in the mode of origin and not in the character of the servitude. The one exists where the debtor voluntarily contracts to enter the service of his creditor. The other is forced upon the debtor by some provision of law. But peon age, however created, is compulsory service — involuntary servitude. A clear distinction exists between peonage and the voluntary performance of labor or rendering of services in payment of a debt. In the latter case the debtor, though con tracting to pay his indebtedness by labor or service, and subject, like any other contractor, to an action for damages for breach of that contract, can elect at any time to break it and no law or force compels performance or a continuance of the service. The operation and scope of the I3th Amendment to the Federal Constitution is con sidered and the statement of Mr. Justice Bradley, in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 20, 23, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18, 28, 30, is quoted with approval: "This Amendment, as well as the i4th, is un doubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of circumstances. By its own unaided force and effect it abolished slavery, and established universal freedom. Still, legislation may be necessary and proper to meet all the various cases and circumstances to be affected by it and to prescribe proper modes of redress for its violation in letter or spirit. And such legis lation may be primary and direct in its character, for the amendment is not a mere prohibition of state laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involun tary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States." Further quotation is made from the same opinion, wherein the distinction between the i3th and i4th Amendments is pointed out, and attention is called to the fact that legislation under the i4th Amendment must necessarily be corrective in its character, counteracting and affording relief against state regulations and pro ceedings, while legislation under the I3th Amend ment may be direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by state legislation or not. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1138, and the Slaughter House cases, are cited to the same point, and it is concluded that the statutes under consideration are directly authorized by the i3th Amendment and that the operation of the statutes is not lim ited to the territories or other parts of the strictly national domain, but extends to all the territory
within the sovereignty of the United States. The decision in the case, however, turns upon a con sideration of the wording of Section 5526, which it will be remembered punishes every person who holds, arrests, or returns, or causes to be held, arrested or returned, etc.. and it is said that three distinct acts are thereby made illegal, to wit: holding, arresting, and returning. The indict ment charged that defendant "did unlawfully and knowingly return one Will Gordon and one Mose Ridley to a condition of peonage," and it is held that a conviction under the indictment is not sustainable without proof of a prior condition of peonage. COPYRIGHT. (INFRINGEMENT — USE OF PRE VIOUSLY COMPILED INFORMATION) U. S. C. C. D. OF MASSACHUSETTS. Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver Radford Co., 134 Federal Reporter 890. is worthy of note as a contribution to the growing list of cases involving the right of compilers of reference works to make use of prior compilations deal ing with the same subject or containing similar facts. In this case it appeared that plaintiff had published a city directory, and that in subse quently compiling its directory defendant had used complainant's directory for the purpose of obtaining information as to names, addresses, and occupations, which information it compared with information previously obtained by an original canvass, and, in cases where such proceeding was necessary, made further investigations. After comparison and the making of further investi gation when the statements in complainant's directory did not coincide with the data previ ously obtained by defendant, the latter printed as its directory the net result of its investigations, which, of course, consisted of plaintiff's directory, with such additions and alterations as defendant's investigation had shown to be necessary. In answering in the negative plaintiff's contention that defendant had no right to do this, the court cites the recent cases of The Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., 122 Fed. 922, and Dun v. International Mercantile Agency, 127 Fed. 173, in the latter of which cases the ruling in the present case was to some extent foreshadowed. Cases dealing with the question involved in the instant case, and the two just cited, are of com paratively recent occurrence, owing, no doubt, to the fact that such quasi-literary publications, as well as the mechanical method of compilation are of comparatively recent origin. The case under consideration seems to go a little in ad vance of any of the preceding cases.
