NOTES OF RECENT CASES of plaintiff. That does not mean, however, that the defendant must pay as much for the second picture as for the first. The true measure of recovery is difficult to figure out, but it can in no event be more than the value of the picture to the defendant nor more than an amount which will compensate plain tiff for its loss. The lack of a market value com plicates the problem. On the measure of damages adopted where a railroad had to pay for a family portrait, see Green v. Boston & Lowell R. R., 128 Mass. 221, 226. Those were not quasi-contract cases, however. In Klug v. Sheriffs the recovery would naturally be very small because the defendant, having already one picture did not care much for the second, and since the defendant cared so little for the second picture that he offered to destroy it, it might well be that recovery could not exceed the value of the paint and canvas as such. But surely if a plaintiff who sues in tort for the destruction of a picture painted and exhibited by plaintiff, which picture was a gross libel of defendant's sister, can recover the value of the paint and canvas (Du Bost v. Beresford, 2 Camp. 511), that much recovery at least should be awarded in a quasi-contract action where the plaintiff has painted a perfectly proper picture with the hope of pleasing the defendant so much that he will buy it and the defendant, in stead of cutting up the picture appropriates and keeps it. A majority of the courts would agree with the Wisconsin court, however, in refusing any recovery. It should be noted that in Klug v. Sher iffs one judge, Mr. Justice Dodge, dissented. The case has been discussed above as one in quasi-contracts. The majority opinion suggests that it was presented to the court as one of con tract implied in fact, and the court got around the point by holding that the plaintiff never had title to the picture and so had nothing to sell to the de fendant. That view seems to be wholly erroneous. Plaintiff certainly owned the canvas and paint and the two combined into a picture by his own labor. On the other hand, that no actual contract by de fendant to purchase the picture was made out seems equally clear; his acts did not belie his words. The question then was essentially one of quasicontract. GEO. P. COSTIGAH, JR. CRIMINAL LAW. (Practice.) R. Y. Sup. Ct. — People ex rel. Jerome, District Attorney v. Court of General Sessions of the Peace, 98 N. Y. S., 557. involves the right of the people on rela tion of the district attorney to a writ of prohibition against the Court of General Sessions to prevent it from taking proceedings on a motion for a new trial on other grounds than newly discovered evi dence, made after conviction of a misdemeanor. The special term of the Supreme Court (98 N. Y.
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S. 66) held that, inasmuch as the statute provided that, except when made on newly discovered evi dence, a motion for new trial must be made before judgment and that as it must be presumed that the court below would construe the statute cor rectly the relator is not entitled to the writ, but on appeal the appellate division of the Supreme Court (98 N. Y. S. 557) held that as the motion for new trial was not made on the ground allowed by the statute the relator was entitled to the writ. The questions raised by the motion for new trial the court held could be considered on an appeal from the judgment of conviction in the court below. DOMICILE. (Residents on Property of United States.) Tenn. Many of the veterans of the Civil War are in their old age taken care of in homes provided for them by the federal govern ment. Being thus wards of the federal govern ment, the question quite often arises as to whether or not the old soldiers who fought for the preser vation of the Union may exercise the right of voters in the states in which the homes are located. A recent case dealing with this question is that of State ex rel. Lyle v. Willett, 97 S. W. Rep., 299. The state of Tennessee had granted its consent to the acquisition by the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers of certain lands for the estab lishment of a branch of such home, but in doing so the state had provided that the act granting this consent should not be construed to deny to inmates who were qualified voters of the state the right to vote. On authority of Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306, 2 Am. Rep. 397, and Ft. Leaven worth Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 5 Sup. Ct. 995, 29 L. Ed. 264, the court held that the land on which the soldiers' home was located was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government. The home being within the exclu sive jurisdiction of the federal government, the residents thereof were consequently non-residents of the state of Tennessee, and since the constitu tion of the state requires voters to be residents of the state and county wherein they offer to vote, the inmates of the home could not be regarded as qualified voters. A proviso in the act giving the state's consent to the acquirement of the property for the home, by which it was sought to reserve the right to vote to inmates who were qualified voters of the state, the court holds to be invalid. A contention that the home was a corporation and that a conveyance of the land to it was not a con veyance to the United States, the court regards as being without force. The members of the board of managers of the home are merely officers of the United States, subject to its control in every re spect. They are together in their organized capa city merely"the'hand ofjthe government in effectu
