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THE GREEN BAG
ating the purposes for which they were appointed. The real and only party in interest in making the purchase was the government of the United States. EMINENT DOMAIN. (Taking City Property for Street.) N. Y. — The right of a city to compensa tion for property of the city taken for the purposes of a street was questioned in In re Van Cortlandt Avenue, 78 Northeastern Reporter, 952. Land had been acquired by the city in fee simple for the purposes of its water supply and paid for from the proceeds of bonds, which were a general charge against the city. Afterwards a part of this prop erty was desired for street purposes, and the ques tion arose as to whether or not the city was entitled to compensation the same as other property own ers whose land is taken for streets. In determin ing this question, the court calls attention to the fact that persons owning property abutting upon land owned by a municipality do not have ease ments in or over the municipal property simply because the property is owned by a municipality and not by an individual; that real property ac quired by a municipality for general corporate purposes and not for street or other special pur poses is held pursuant to the deeds of conveyance the same as individuals hold real property, and that the abutting owners on the lands in question prior to the condemnation proceedings did not have any right of access over the same or right to protect the free circulation of light and air to their property. So far as the city was concerned, it could undoubtedly have devoted the land to street purposes, but as the city owned the land in fee, it could have erected thereon a public building, maintained a public park, or, if the property was not required for the purposes of the water supply_ it could have been sold, and the proceeds of the sale applied to the general purposes of the corpora tion and to the advantage of the general taxpayer. When the property was dedicated to the use of the public as a street, this was inconsistent with the absolute fee. By such dedication, the general taxpayer suffers a damage and the abutting owner acquires an advantage. The city is therefore en titled to compensation. EQUITY. (Contracts in Restraint of Trade.) U. S. C. C, E. D. N. Y. — The rights of a manufac turer of a proprietary medicine, by virtue of con tracts made with wholesale dealers binding them to sell the medicine only at a certain price and only to retail dealers, who also had contracts with the manufacturer fixing the price at which the medi cine should be sold to consumers, are involved in Wells & Richardson Co. v. Abraham, 146 Federal Reporter 190. Complainants are the manufac turers of Paine's Celery Compound and defendants are the owners of a large department store in New
York. Complainants brought action to restrain defendants from selling the compound at a price less than that stipulated in the agreement which complainants had made with the wholesale dealers to whom they sold the medicine. Defendants had no contract with complainants and purchased the medicine from other parties. Before selling the medicine they removed the cartoons and labels and other printed matter usually attached to or wrapped around the bottles containing the medi cine. This the court considered as evidence of connivance with persons under contract with complainants and as showing that the medicine was purchased from persons interdicted by con tract from selling it. The court calls attention to numerous cases in which similar contracts had been upheld and holds that complainants are entitled to the relief demanded. The court makes it clear that the case must be carefully distinguished from cases where the purchase had been made from per sons who had a right to sell to the purchaser, such as Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U. S. 660, 15 Sup. Ct. 738, 39 L. Ed. 848, and from cases where the facts did not show a contract, as, for instance, Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus (C. C), 139 Fed. 155. EQUITY. (Interpleader.) Mo. App. — A case of peculiar interest is Lavelle v. Belliu, 97 S. W. 200, involving, as it does, the right of a bailee of found property to interplead in an action for the possession of such property. On review of the authorities the court finds that both by English statute and by the course of practice of the Eng lish courts of equity, the finder of personal property is entitled to interplead in an action for the posses sion of such property. No cases are found in the Missouri courts where the question has arisen, but the court is persuaded that unless plaintiff is allowed to interplead he will be without sufficient protection from demands of the different claim ants, and that he will be harrassed by more than one law suit, and subject to the risk of paying lawyers' fees and costs, for which there would be no remuneration, and as it is a familiar and well established principle that equity will grant relief where the party has no adequate remedy at law, the court believes that the proceedings in the case at bar can be upheld on that ground, and that, therefore, a bailee of property found was entitled to interplead in an action between the finder and others for the possession of such property. EQUITY (Specific Performance — Injunction.) Ia. — In H. W. Gossard Co. v. Crosby, 109 N. W. 483, plaintiff had engaged defendant to sell corsets for it and to give lectures pertaining to physical culture, and brought suit for an injunction to re strain her from working for a rival company. In
